

8/9/78

Folder Citation: Collection: Office of Staff Secretary; Series: Presidential Files; Folder: 8/9/78;
Container 88

To See Complete Finding Aid:

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Staff_Secretary.pdf

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
8/9/78	R. Jayne to The President one page <i>Open 12/19/84</i>	8/9/78	A

FILE LOCATION

8/9/78

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)

FORM OF DOCUMENT	CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
Memo	<p>Moore & Beckel to Pres. Carter, w/attachments 7 pp., re: Arms Sales</p> <p><i>6 pages opened 2/2/95</i></p>	8/8/78	A

FILE LOCATION

Carter Presidential Papers-Staff Offices, Office of Staff Sec.-Presidential Handwriting File 8/9/78 Box 98

RESTRICTION CODES

- (A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
- (B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
- (C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.

4111
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

Zbig Brzezinski

The attached was returned in the
President's outbox today and is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Frank Moore
Jim McIntyre

ARMS SALES TO IRAN

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

4755

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

August 7, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

SUBJECT: Arms Sales to Iran

Last month you approved the sale of 31 F-4Es equipped with SHRIKE missiles as part of the package Under Secretary Newsom would present to the Shah during his visit. This combination represents a minimum response to the Shah's request for an anti-radiation capability to counter the highly developed and mobile SAM threat in Iraq and the USSR, and I indicated that we would be reviewing the request more thoroughly.

Although we are unwilling to provide the sophisticated F-4G WILD WEASEL aircraft equipped with the STANDARD ARM anti-radiation missile at this time, as requested by the Shah, we believe Iran's defense would be significantly improved by the addition of an anti-radiation capability and we do not rule out the possibility of providing the F-4G at some point in the future.

At issue now is whether to approve an interim step which conveys our intention of supplying a more advanced anti-radiation capability but allows us to phase Iran's acquisition of such a capability over time depending on how the surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat and other factors develop. Specifically, should the 31 F-4Es be equipped with the necessary wiring to allow the economic conversion to the F-4G configuration in the future?

In the memorandum at Tab A State and ACDA argue that we should not approve the wiring. Cy's arguments include: the violations of PD-13 guidelines involved; the expected sharply negative Congressional reaction; the lack of a military threat to justify this system at this time; and the impression that would be conveyed to the Shah by changing our decision that "we are easily swayed". In the memorandum at Tab B, Defense argues that we should approve this sale on the grounds that: retrofitting the aircraft later should the Iraqi threat develop would be very expensive; and that the wiring itself provides no additional capability.

I agree with Harold on this. We gain nothing by turning down the Shah on such a request. However I must point out that Congress is likely to see approval of the wiring as tantamount to approval

~~SECRET/GDS~~~~SECRET~~

of the F-4G technology, and may therefore oppose it -- perhaps quite strongly. We would probably win the eventual vote, but the debate could detract from other urgent priorities during the closing days of this session.

One way of reducing the anticipated Congressional displeasure with the proposed sale of the F-4s with Group A wiring would be to accompany the request with a Presidential commitment along the following lines:

I have notified the Government of Iran that the inclusion of Group A wiring in these aircraft does not constitute a commitment to provide in the future any specific radiation suppression equipment or weapons associated with such equipment. The decision to make available the Group A wiring at this time was taken only on the grounds that Iran wished to retain the option of acquiring an enhanced radiation suppression capability at some point in the future, recognizing that retrofit would be far more expensive than production line installation. Any future equipment will be made as a separate decision on its own merits, including full consultation from Congress.

I believe that such a statement would help defuse the opposition in Congress by making it clear that the decision was taken primarily on economic grounds and that the Congress would have an opportunity to express its views on any additional decisions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve sale of the wiring necessary for converting the F-4Es to F-4Gs including the STANDARD ARM anti-radiation missile. (I come out this way with many reservations, but largely because I am concerned about Iran's sense of confidence -- about U.S. and its own future -- given the developments in Afghanistan and in the region generally.)

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE ✓

That you approve the above statement which would accompany the Congressional notification.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____



MOO E & JORDAN
COMMENTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1978

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

FRANK MOORE *Fm.*
BOB BECKEL *BB*

SUBJECT:

Arms Sale to Iran

White House CL concurs strongly with Secretary Vance on the inclusion of special wiring to the F-4's to Iran.

Congressional reaction will be extremely negative. We are just now repairing the wounds left over from the Saudi F-15's. The proposed sale would antagonize the same moderate/liberal group who opposed that sale. Additionally, we will anger the Leadership by sending up anything at this late date which will surely develop into a major fight. With the 50-day notification period ending just before Congress adjourns, we may find Bob Byrd opposing us as he did on AWAC's, i.e. not on substance, but on timing and procedure.

Finally, we do not agree that this is a winnable issue. All those Senators who helped on the Saudi sale would like nothing better than to oppose this sale to appease their Jewish supporters who will certainly oppose us. In the House, a Mideast issue could easily fall prey to election-year politics.

HAMILTON JORDAN COMMENT: "I agree with Cy and Frank Moore. We do not have the political capital to expend on another controversial foreign policy issue now. To do so would be at the expense of other things more important to us."

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

PER

11/13/93 NKC HY RE MR-NKC-92-46

BY

1/26/93 NARS, DATE

~~SECRET~~

OMB
COMMENT

~~SECRET~~



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Randy Jayne *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: NSC Memo on Arms Sales to Iran

You have seen the conflicting views of NSC and Defense versus State and ACDA on this issue. OMB has serious reservations about approving the Group A wiring:

The other memoranda fail to point out that the addition of the Group A wiring now would add \$1.5-2 million per plane (versus \$3-4 million for a subsequent retrofit). The Shah will, of course, use the \$45-60 million premium he would have paid as leverage to force us to sell him the missiles at a later date.

More importantly, OMB remains concerned that the Administration has not yet formulated a coherent overall arms sales strategy toward Iran. U.S. policy to Iran is probably the most critical element of your overall arms sales ceiling policy, yet we are still approaching individual sales cases on an incremental basis.

Recommendation

That you not approve the Group A wiring unless you believe that we would be willing to sell the STANDARD ARM missile to Iran.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 34

PER *[Signature]* 72-0421-17 RE MR NLC-92-67
BY *[Signature]* NARS, DATE 12/14/94

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE

Wednesday - August 9, 1978

9:30 Return from New York City

10:00 Meeting with Congressional Group/Civil
Service Reform. (Mr. Frank Moore).
The Cabinet Room.

10:30 Mr. Jody Powell - The Oval Office.

10:50 Meeting with Group of Mayors on Supplemental
(10 min.) Fiscal Assistance. (Mr. Jack Watson) -
The Cabinet Room.

11:15 U.S. News and World Report Interview.
(60 min.) (Mr. Jerry Rafshoon) - The Oval Office.

12:20 Photograph with Mr. Rudolph Nureyev.
(5 min.) (Mr. Jack Watson) - The Oval Office.

12:25 Drop-By White House Staff Picnic - South Grounds.
(10 min.)

12:35 Lunch with Mrs. Rosalynn Carter - Oval Office.
(60 min.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

FOR THE RECORD:

Bob Lipshutz was given a copy of the cover memo today and the originals of the attached unsigned contracts.



Fred M. Gregg, Jr., CLU
Executive Vice President - Marketing

*Job -
info - see
former note
J*

Equitable Life Insurance Co.
Home Office:
1700 Old Meadow Road
P.O. Box 900
McLean, Virginia 22101

August 8, 1978

Mr. Robert Lipshutz
White House

Dear Bob:

Attached are copies of the forms we need to complete to execute the copyright for the President's Sunday School lesson we've taped. John Shouse, Attorney, taught this class for twenty five years.

Please return forms to me at 740 Potomac River Road, McLean, Virginia 22102.

Any changes or suggestions would be appreciated.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Fred'.

Fred M. Gregg, Jr.

FMG:ck

Attachments

JOHN H. SHOUSE

Attorney at Law

3806 VEAZEY STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016
TELEPHONE: EMERSON 3-5453

June 26, 1978

Fred M. Gregg, Jr.
740 Potomac River Road,
McLean Virginia, 22101

Dear Fred,


The enclosed drafts are slightly revised from those previously given to you. While the changes are minor, and the first drafts can be used, I believe these are improvements and should be used.

I have no pride of authorship and if you or Mr. Lipshultz wish to make changes, we only wish to get the job done. The copyright office does not require any particular form of assignment, and the one enclosed is of my own composition.

The only document which will concern either Mr. Lipshultz or the President is the assignment which must be signed by the President before we can proceed. The application will be signed only by you.

You will note that I have identified the recordings only by date. This is sufficient for purposes of the assignment particularly since we are obtaining rights not only to those which have been made but those which will be made hereafter. Before filing the SR form, you should give careful consideration to titles which will have sales appeal-- a fact that is so self evident that you know it better than I.

Sincerely,



John Shouse

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D. C.

ASSIGNMENT

In consideration of the benefits I enjoy, and shall continue to enjoy as a member of the First Baptist Church, 16th & O Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., I hereby assign, transfer, and set over unto the said Church and its assigns, any recordings of my voice in teaching Bible Lessons at the Church which have been made or which may hereafter be made. This assignment and transfer is for the use and benefit of the said Church and its assigns.

By this assignment, I transfer all my literary property, right, title, and interest in and to the recordings (including those heretofore made and any which may hereafter be made) and any and all benefit and advantage to arise from duplicating, publishing, and vending the same. Bible Lessons which have heretofore been recorded at the Church are identified by date as follows:

Bible Lesson of November 6, 1977
Bible Lesson of January 29, 1978
Bible Lesson of March 12, 1978
Bible Lesson of June 25, 1978

And I do hereby give to the said First Baptist Church of Washington the full power and authority at its own cost to enter the recordings so identified and others which may hereafter be made as described above for copyright, or to apply for and receive the renewal or extension of said copyright as allowed by the laws of the United States..

Executed this day of 1978.

Witness:

10:50 AM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Jack Watson *Jack*
Anne Wexler
Stu Eizenstat
Gene Eidenberg *Gene*

SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH A GROUP OF MAYORS
ON URBAN PROGRAMS - Wednesday, August 9,
1978 at 10:50 a.m. (10 mins.) (Cabinet Room)

PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN:

The mayors of 19 big cities (list attached).
There will be a one-minute photo session at
the beginning of the meeting; following the
meeting, the mayors will brief the press.

BACKGROUND & TALKING POINTS:

The mayors are here to lobby for key pieces of the urban
policy and are particularly concerned about three issues:

- (1) Supplemental Fiscal Assistance;
- (2) Restrictive amendments to the CETA
Reauthorization Bill; and
- (3) Labor Intensive Public Works.

They are also visiting the House and Senate Leadership and
Senate Finance Committee members in behalf of Supplemental
Fiscal Assistance. The 7 to 6 defeat in L. H. Fountain's
Subcommittee last week seems to have mobilized them.

Supplemental Fiscal Assistance:

The Supplemental Fiscal Assistance Program will be considered
by the Senate Finance Committee on Thursday. We have been
working closely with Senators Moynihan, Hathaway and Muskie
to develop a compromise proposal that could pass the Senate

Finance Committee. Such a proposal would contain the key elements of Muskie's "counter-cyclical" program and of your "supplemental fiscal assistance" program. We are optimistic that the compromise will receive Senator Long's support.

Talking Points

- This legislation is one of the Administration's top priorities. It's on the short list of priorities developed by the Administration, the Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader.
- The Administration expended substantial efforts trying to get this bill through an unfriendly House Subcommittee, because the Senate Finance Committee refused to act before the House. The President, the Vice President and senior White House officials all made calls and worked on various Subcommittee members. Unfortunately, that Subcommittee is composed entirely of rural members.
- We are pleased that the Mayors are in town to express their support for SFA, because their help is needed. Until the Mayors arrived, the climate to pass this bill simply didn't exist. Congress is concerned about the deficit and inflation, and seemed to feel that this money was not needed. The Mayors should take it upon themselves to reverse that impression.
- You could point out that, at times, you felt that the Administration was fighting alone for SFA and that even some of our strongest supporters in Congress and the interest groups suggested that the program should be phased out. The Mayor's presence should help change that view.

- We must work together to reverse the impression in Congress and the Washington press that there is no progress being made on or support for the urban policy initiatives. Congress simply seems to feel no sense of urgency on these issues, an impression that we must correct jointly.
- We worked closely with Senators Hathaway, Moynihan, Muskie and Long to put together a compromise bill on the Senate side. During those discussions, the Administration pressed for an ongoing program of targeted fiscal assistance, because we recognize that a drop in the national unemployment rate from 6.1 percent to 5.9 percent does not signal complete recovery for all of America's cities. We are pleased that the final compromise includes an ongoing fiscal assistance program of \$500 million.
- You should report on your earlier conversation with Chairman Long and suggest that the full resources of the Administration will be behind the compromise bill on Thursday.

Labor Intensive Public Works:

The Mayors' other major priority in the urban policy is the Labor Intensive Public Works Program. This program provides \$1 billion a year in each of the next three fiscal years. The funds are to be used for rehabilitation and maintenance of public facilities.

Talking Points:

- This bill also is a top priority in the Administration's urban policy. You met earlier with Senators Randolph and Burdick and Congressmen Roe and Johnson on this issue.

- o We are in the midst of negotiations with the Senate and the House to obtain support for a compromise position, which would contain elements of the Administration's Labor Intensive Public Works Program and the Congress' Local Public Works - Round III.
- o Their help is needed to get the Public Works Committee to move this year. Here again, the impression exists in the Committees that these funds are not needed.

Restrictive Amendments to CETA:

Mayor Coleman Young may raise the issue of CETA reauthorization. The mayors are concerned with the issue of limitations on local supplementation of jobs, substitution of federally funded jobs for local jobs, and overall funding levels. They understand that, in the House, restrictions on these issues are necessary for passage. They are asking that, in the Senate, the Administration support the waiver of these restrictions for impacted cities at the discretion of the Secretary of Labor.

Talking Points:

- o You should say that you understand that CETA is on the floor in the House today (Wednesday), that it is necessary to target CETA jobs more sharply on the disadvantaged by limiting supplementation, and point out that the bill already contains some discretion for the Secretary to waive the restrictions for cities in difficulty.
- o You should say that you will consider the mayors' request as we develop a floor strategy for the Senate, but not commit yourself to accepting their recommendations.

List of Mayors for August 9 Meeting with the President

Coleman Young (spokesperson)	Detroit
Lee Alexander	Syracuse
Kenneth E. Bowen	Lafayette, Louisiana
Richard Caliguiri	Pittsburgh
Arthur Clark	Waltham, Massachusetts
Kenneth Gibson	Newark
Richard Hatcher	Gary
Arthur Holland	Trenton
George Latimer	St. Paul
John Mandanici	Bridgeport, Connecticut
Tom Moody	Columbus
Ernest Morial	New Orleans
George Moscone	San Francisco
Ray Salazar	El Paso
Francis F. X. Smith	Jersey City
David Vann	Birmingham
Kevin White	Boston
Warren Widener	Berkeley
Michael A. Bilandic	Chicago

Dorothy Brodie - U.S. Conference of Mayors Staff
Tom Cochran - U.S. Conference of Mayors Staff

Sup Fiscal Assistance
Loc Int Pub Wks
CETA
Civil Service
Nat Gas

meeting with mayors
8/9/78

Energy - Soc Sec - Urban -
Farm - NYC - Energy -
Paperwork - Do E - Energy
Unemp - Deficits - Int'l

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8/9/78

Mr. President --

Frank Moore said that

Senator Kennedy is going....

(he won't be traveling with
the First Lady since he had
to leave at a different time.)

--SSC

*Tell Frank he
will be leaving
later than
planned
J*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8/9/78

Mr. President:

Cong. Corman would like to
see you this afternoon on the
gas vote. He wants to meet after
3 pm. Moore recommends. At
what time should I schedule him?

Phil

3:00
J

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

P
8/9/78

Mr. President:

Sec. Vance would like to meet
with you tomorrow morning. I can
schedule him for 9 am. Shall I
proceed?

Phil

ok
J

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

Ed Sanders

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: The Vice President
Hamilton Jordan
Zbig Brzezinski
Phil Wise

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

ACTION
FYI

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> VICE PRESIDENT
	EIZENSTAT
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> JORDAN
	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON
	WEXLER
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE

☒ Sanders

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	COSTANZA
	CRUIKSHANK
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PETTIGREW
	PRESS
	RAFSHOON
	SCHNEIDERS
	VOORDE
	WARREN
	WISE

	ADAMS
	ANDRUS
	BELL
	BERGLAND
	BLUMENTHAL
	BROWN
	CALIFANO
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1978

J

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ED SANDERS **ES**

SUBJECT: CAMP DAVID SUMMIT MEETING

During the day I have been in contact with community people throughout the country. Their reaction to the announcement of the Camp David meeting has been uniformly positive and affirmative.

Among others I talked to Ted Mann, President of the Presidents' Conference, Richard Maas President of the American Jewish Committee and Howard Squadron President of the American Jewish Congress.

The Presidents' Conference has issued a statement supporting the meeting and congratulating you and the Administration. The American Jewish Congress has also issued a similar supportive statement.

I suggest the following:

- (a) An early meeting with Ted Mann.
- (b) A briefing by Secretary Vance for 10 - 15 community leaders shortly after his return.

*Vance or V.P.
ok if he wishes
to do so*

ES:ss

c.c. Hamilton Jordan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 9, 1978

Stu Eizenstat

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for your
information.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Frank Moore

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DICK PETTIGREW

The attached was returned in
Mrs. Carter's outbox. It is
being forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.


Madeline MacBean

8/7/78

COPIES YOU REQUESTED
mfm

*RSC - Original
returned to you*

*Send to
Jimmy
for information.*



*To Stu
info only*

J





HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20515

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI
3RD DISTRICT MARYLAND

August 4, 1978

Mrs. Rosalyn Carter
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Rosalyn,

Enclosed is a copy of the resolution I am planning on introducing next week. I believe that this resolution expresses the concern of many senior veterans.

I hope that both you and the President will review this proposal. I believe that this resolution will show the veterans of this country that the President really cares about them.

I have discussed this with representatives of various veterans groups, and thus far I have received positive reactions to it.

I look forward to hearing from you and the President about my resolution- perhaps we could take an initiative by early next week.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Barbara".

Barbara A. Mikulski
Member of Congress

BAM/crs
enclosure

[DISCUSSION DRAFT]
August 3, 1978

95th CONGRESS
2d Session

H. J. RES. _____

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Ms. Mikulski introduced the following joint resolution; which was
referred to the Committee on _____

JOINT RESOLUTION

Directing the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to recommend to
the Congress ways of improving the quality of health care
provided the Nation's aging veterans.

Whereas the people of the United States are grateful to the
millions of veterans who fought valiently to defend the
United States in all parts of the world;

Whereas the United States should fully recognize the gallant
service of its veterans in considering the future needs of
the veterans' population;

Whereas the number of veterans is in excess of 29,000,000,
26,000,000 of whom are World War II veterans with an average
age of 58;

Whereas by the year 2000 the number of veterans 65 years of age or more will be three times the number today; and

Whereas the United States should make every effort to maintain the dignity of the aging veteran and to allow him to share his years of retirement with his family and comrades in comfort: Now, therefore, be it

1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of
2 the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 That the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs shall prepare and
4 submit to the Committees on Veterans' Affairs of the Senate
5 and House of Representatives a report containing
6 recommendations and proposals for means of improving the
7 delivery of health care and related services to senior
8 veterans and of ensuring that senior veterans receive
9 comprehensive, high quality health care and related services.
10 Such report shall include such plans for administrative
11 action and such recommendations for legislation as the
12 Administrator considers appropriate and shall be submitted
13 not later than December 31, 1979.

14 Sec. 2. In preparing the report required under the first
15 section of this Act, the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs
16 shall study the feasibility and desirability of--

17 (1) providing retirement counseling and planning
18 services for senior veterans;

(2) converting unused acute-care hospital facilities under the jurisdiction of the Administrator to long-term care facilities;

(3) expanding the number of hospital-based home care units under the jurisdiction of the Administrator;

(4) expanding and improving long-term and catastrophic health care programs of the Veterans' Administration;

(5) establishing new facilities to provide daytime care (in lieu of nursing home care) for senior veterans who are able to live with their families;

(6) establishing hospice programs for terminally ill senior veterans; and

(7) extending health care services to surviving spouses of veterans.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, the term "senior veteran" means a veteran who is 65 years of age or older.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 9, 1978

Landon Butler

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: The Vice President
Gretchen Poston

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

ACTION
FYI

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

	VICE PRESIDENT
	EIZENSTAT
	JORDAN
	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON
	WEXLER
	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
X	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	COSTANZA
	CRUIKSHANK
	FALLOWS
X	FIRST LADY <i>Post</i>
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PETTIGREW
	PRESS
	RAFSHOON
	SCHNEIDERS
	VOORDE
	WARREN
	WISE

	ADAMS
	ANDRUS
	BELL
	BERGLAND
	BLUMENTHAL
	BROWN
	CALIFANO
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. President:

Fran and Gretchen concur;
Phil has no objection.

Rick/Bill

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

LANDON BUTLER 

DATE:

AUGUST 7, 1978

SUBJECT:

RECEPTION FOR THE AMERICAN FEDERATION
OF TEACHERS

You have hosted a very successful series of receptions for union members visiting Washington for their unions' conventions or political workshops. These receptions have been exceptionally popular among union members and their leaders and have helped us to develop friendly relationships with several individual union presidents.

The American Federation of Teachers last February requested that you host a White House reception for a group of their members who will be in Washington for the AFT convention. The convention, unfortunately, will be held while you are on vacation. Secretary Marshall and Secretary Califano also will be on vacation at that time.

I would like to ask your permission to use the White House for a reception to be hosted by Vice President Mondale on August 23, 1978. The Vice President has indicated his willingness to host the reception in your absence.

☒ Approve

☐ Disapprove 

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 9, 1978

Secretary Vance

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: Zbig Brzezinski

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
✓	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

ACTION
FYI

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

	VICE PRESIDENT
	EIZENSTAT
	JORDAN
	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON
	WEXLER
✓	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	COSTANZA
	CRUIKSHANK
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PETTIGREW
	PRESS
	RAFSHOON
	SCHNEIDERS
	VOORDE
	WARREN
	WISE

	ADAMS
	ANDRUS
	BELL
	BERGLAND
	BLUMENTHAL
	BROWN
	CALIFANO
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
✓	VANCE

August 9, 1978

*Cy - I
told him that
along with
other cases we
would help. No
singling out of
his mother
J*

Dear Mr. President,

It is with pleasure that I am performing in your Nation's capital. I have always received warm responses from audiences in the United States, and Washington has been no exception.

I am grateful for the opportunity of meeting with you today and am honored to be among your guests at the White House. On this occasion, I would like to restate a matter of great importance to me and my family.


I have for some 14 years, been trying to arrange for my mother, now 75, my sister and my niece to visit me in the West. Permission has been consistently denied by Soviet authorities.

In August of 1975, the Soviets pledged, at Helsinki to "favorably consider application for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily... in order to visit members of their family." By denying my family their travel rights, the Soviets are in clear violation of that international agreement.

I appeal to you Mr. President, to personally intervene on my behalf. My mother is quite old, I have not seen her or any members of my family since 1961, and long desperately for a reunion. It would be a most meaningful and joyous experience for my mother especially.

Please Mr. President, I implore you to use whatever means you deem appropriate to act on my family's behalf.

Respectfully,


Rudolf Nureyev

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

Jerry Rafshoon

The attached was returned in the President's outbox today and is forwarded to you for appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson

cc: The Vice President
Jody Powell

	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

ACTION
FYI

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

	✓ VICE PRESIDENT
	EIZENSTAT
	JORDAN
	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	✓ POWELL
	WATSON
	WEXLER
	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BUTLER
	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	COSTANZA
	CRUIKSHANK
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PETTIGREW
	PRESS
	✓ RAFSHOON
	SCHNEIDERS
	VOORDE
	WARREN
	WISE

	ADAMS
	ANDRUS
	BELL
	BERGLAND
	BLUMENTHAL
	BROWN
	CALIFANO
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1978

J

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Jerry Rafshoon *JR*
SUBJECT: Announcement of Cash Management

You have asked me to think about the best way to publicize the new improvements in federal cash management - which will save \$53 million annually. This development follows an earlier announcement of a measure saving \$125 million.

I suggest that you make the announcement in the press room with McIntyre and Blumenthal (who has been instrumental) present and then let them brief.

I am not sure what we would get but I think we need to find out if this approach is workable.

Yes, schedule announcement

No, let McIntyre and
Blumenthal do it

See me

✓ - or Fritz

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

C

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Frank Moore *FM/LF*
Les Francis *Les Francis*

SUBJECT:

Civil Service Reorganization Plan No. 2

We have just received word that the House of Representatives approved the Civil Service Reorganization Plan by a vote of 381 - 19. Indications are that the Senate will not take up a resolution of disapproval so the plan will go into effect automatically this weekend. A call from you to Chairman Jack Brooks thanking him for his leadership on this portion of our Civil Service Reform effort is warranted.

Plans are for Scotty Campbell to make a press statement acknowledging today's win. Jody is handling the details on this.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

C

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GRETCHEN POSTON *Ep*

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR STAFF PICNIC
WITH MUDDY WATERS AND BAND

Muddy Waters got his nickname from his grandmother because he would sneak outside and play in the mud on their rural Delta Mississippi home (he lived on a plantation with her after his mother died). His original name is McKinley Morganfield.

His new album, "I'm Ready" won a 1977 Rolling Stones Critics Award for Album of the Year.

Muddy has won many Grammy nominations and awards for his music mostly in the category of Best Ethnic or Traditional Recording for his many albums.

Currently, Muddy is on the road with his outstanding band reviving the renewed popular interest in his blues material. His music has made him a legend as he brings an unusual dignity and fluid grace in his blues phrasing.

Some of his many hits include, "Kansas City", "Got My Mojo Working" and the original "Rollin' Stone".

Muddy was elected to the Black Music Hall of Fame by Ebony Magazine readers in 1973.

This is the second staff picnic and they have become so popular that this one was sold out in 3 days.

----Also outside at the picnic today with Chip is the son of President Giscard d'Estaing of France.

----The art show on the South Grounds was organized by art enthusiasts in the EOB and are samplings of art produced by staff members.

12:15 PM

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Meeting with Louis Giscard d'Estaing
Wednesday, August 9
12:15 p.m.
3 minutes
Oval Office

(by: Fran Voorde)

I. PURPOSE

Photo opportunity

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, PRESS:

A. Background

Louis Giscard d'Estaing, son of the President of France, is working in Rhode Island for Bruce Sundlun. Two years ago while working for Sundlun he had an informal visit with President Ford, and would like to do the same with you.

Sundlun is a prominent Rhode Island businessman, and highly-regarded political activist. You stayed in his home during the campaign. *He's also Sen. Pell's liaison manager*
(RC)

Chip will take the group to lunch in the Mess immediately after your visit.

B. Participants

Louis Giscard d'Estaing
Mr. & Mrs. Bruce Sundlun (Joy)
Mr. Bardyl Tirana (accompanying)

C. Press

White House Photographer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

Frank Moore

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox. It is
forwarded to you for appropriate
handling.

Rick Hutcheson

TALKING POINTS FOR PHONE CALL
TO GOV. MARTIN SCHREIBER

*Frank - Will
Cicchetti will
help. Call Schlesinger
J*

Talking Points for Phone Call to Wisconsin

Governor Martin Schreiber

- The world is watching to see if we come to grips with our energy problem. In view of my pledge to foreign leaders, and the increasing concern over the dollar, we cannot afford to fail.
- The natural gas conference report is a sound compromise that will be good for the nation. It will significantly increase supplies of our premium fuel for the nation's consumers while providing price certainty and new markets for the nation's producers.
- This is just as true in Wisconsin as anywhere else in the nation. Yet Henry Reuss, who originally committed to support the compromise conference report has indicated he has withdrawn his support based on letters from you and Charles Cicchetti, Chairman of the State Public Utilities Commission, indicating that the bill will be bad for Wisconsin. *"Chi-
Chet. ti"*
- Marty, Congressman Reuss's support is critical to the enactment of this bill, and the counsel that the bill is bad for Wisconsin is simply not true.
 - o Mr. Cicchetti has suggested that intrastate pipelines will be able to pay more for gas than interstate pipelines, drawing gas away from States like Wisconsin. This results from a misreading of the draft materials and simply is not true.
 - o He has suggested that Wisconsin's industrial users will be driven off gas, thereby increasing residential gas prices. This is not true.
 - o Under the bill's incremental pricing provisions, the supply of gas in Wisconsin will increase for residential and industrial users at prices WELL BELOW the cost of any other substitute fuels.

- If you need further clarification of these matters, I want to urge you to talk with Jim Schlesinger. His staff has already been in touch with Mr. Cicchetti and discussed these misunderstandings with him.
- Even the Act's opponents do not dispute the critical fact that substantial additional quantities of sorely needed natural gas will flow into the interstate market, particularly to States like Wisconsin, at prices below that of the displaced alternate fuels.
 - o This could result in a savings of up to 1 million barrels per day of imported oil by 1985, and \$5 billion a year in our balance of payments.
 - o Without this bill, the only way new gas will flow into interstate commerce will be if FERC substantially raises the interstate gas price - an approach that leaves us with all the uncertainties and court challenges associated with the current, outdated regulatory framework and ultimately cost even more.
 - o Under this bill there will once again be enough gas at economical prices to resume home hook-ups.
 - o Your State Commission is to be commended for beginning to implement a form of incremental pricing that will protect home consumers from increasing costs. This bill will make that effort a national objective and encourage further State efforts in this direction.
 - o There will also be expanding use of gas in industry, particularly the special process uses for which gas is best suited.
- Failure to pass this bill could indefinitely postpone the Alaskan Gas Pipeline Project. Some of the upper-mid west pipelines that originally supported the now defunct Arctic Gas pipeline to transport Alaska natural gas would like to kill the ALCAN project. Without new natural gas legislation, the ALCAN project cannot go forward. These upper-mid west lines do not face the near term shortage of gas and thus see little risk in opposing the compromise.

- If we lose this bill now, we will have lost the chance for forging a rational, middle-ground approach to natural gas policy.
- Failure of the Compromise:
 - o Will back-up sorely needed gas production in the intrastate market.
 - o Continue the trend of declining supplies in the interstate market.
 - o Lead to the increasing use of higher priced foreign energy.
 - o Continue to occupy the Congressional calendar with a debate on natural gas in the coming years.
 - o Destroy the possibility for acting on a comprehensive energy program this year.
- The Country, the Party, and I need your help in straightening out any misunderstandings about this bill, and securing the vote needed to report the first natural gas bill in twenty years to the House and Senate.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

FRANK MOORE
BILL CABLE *bill*

SUBJECT: Rules Committee Action on the Tax Bill

The Rules Committee granted a rule on the tax bill which allows for a vote on the following amendments:

1. Archer -- which is the indexing of capital gains
2. Vanik/Pickle -- which is a straight extension of expiring cuts
3. Fisher/Corman -- which is the amendment we support
4. Kemp/Roth -- which is a motion to recommit

By a vote of 7 - 8, the Committee refused to make in order the Gephardt Amendment on Social Security Tax Credit. Many of the younger, more liberal Members feel betrayed by the Rules Committee action and are angry at the Leadership (not us). The Chairman, Mr. Delaney, John Young of Texas and Morgan Murphy of Illinois joined with the five Republicans to defeat the Gephardt Amendment. Because these Members are usually persuadable by the Speaker, and because we have been opposed to the Social Security Tax Credit, Tip is being blamed for the loss. The Republicans and the "mid America" Democrats, with the Leadership and the Administration on board will pass this rule tomorrow.

The biggest difficulty we face is the vote on the Archer Amendment. Our preliminary count shows substantial Democratic defection and very little time to change minds. We should beat Kemp/Roth by a substantial margin. We should also beat Vanik/Pickle.

Late today we began working with a group of Members and the Leadership to pass the Fisher/Corman Amendment. At this point, our vote looks promising and we may come out of the House with a tax bill which is not the disaster which had been predicted. There is no resemblance to the bill you submitted.

Votes on the rule and the bill will occur tomorrow.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8/9/78

Incoming Congressional letter
was dated May 18, 1978 (*see clip*)

Individual responses to each
Congressman who signed May letter
were sent by DoD on June 8, 1978.

Washington Star interview was
printed in August.

There apparently has been no
other Congressional inquiry
since that time (May).

Separate file attached re
staff correspondence.

(Seems to me the good Chaplain
hasn't been quite honest in
his comments or in how he's
playing the game.)

--SSC

C

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Susan
Ltr to me
J



—Associated Press

us in which 41 died yesterday.

41 Bodies

was a boat anchored offshore. "I
There was nobody on shore so I

its came running from nearby
but they could not free the boat

wife escaped from the bus
"I don't know how she made it
doesn't swim."
erron told a news conference
easily investigated the driver
condition — no alcohol, noth-

ent visiting the area for the
ed soon after the bus sank
ook a rowboat out to where
in the darkness.

HICKING and we were
s by the neck or some-
em into our boat. There
e in the water. I'm not
lled into shore except I
omen," Rake said
or the show and were
ething about a little
," said Benoit Clche,
e la Marjolaine. He
were really happy.
and it made them

hen turned onto a
ost immediately
thirds of a mile

ived here in a
ows everybody
otre Dame de

around the

Q and A Ex-Army Chaplain Blasts Services' Up-or-Out System

Salvatorian Father Joseph Turner, a former Army chaplain and co-founder of the Chaplains' Promotion Research Committee, has sparked a congressional inquiry into the hiring and firing practices of the military with regard to chaplains. He was interviewed by Washington Star Staff Writer William F. Willoughby.

Question: You've said there are considerable disparities in the faith quotas in the armed forces, particularly the Army. Could you explain this?


Turner: In the Army Chaplain Corps there is a total procurement goal of 1,465 for fiscal year 1978. These are allocated spots for clergymen to provide spiritual coverage for the troops. The disparity rests not so much on the fact that there's a shortage of chaplains, because there is no a shortage in the aggregate, as there is with doctors. But to inform the Congress that there is a shortage of doctors and not of chaplains is a dangerous deception because there is a critical shortage of denominational balance within the chaplaincy.

Q: What's being done?

A: The Pennsylvania congressional delegation recently wrote a letter to President Carter to alert him to this serious issue. "With the support of the national religious organizations the services have been instructed to maintain a chaplain corps composed of proportionally represented clergymen," the letter said, but certain faiths are underrepresented. This document has been signed by 20 members of the congressional delegation, including the two senators. It was sponsored by Rep. Joe Hammerman of Pennsylvania and has not received an answer. We're trusting that the answer will be on the presidential investigative level and not bucked back through the Department of Defense for an appropriate answer on behalf of the president.

Q: The Roman Catholic Church, which has 49 million members in the United States, is supposed to have approximately 420 chaplains in the Army. Yet there are only 248, or a deficit of over 170. Is this what you're talking about?

A: The Catholic shortage has been highlighted by Terence Cardinal Cook's office, the chief military apostolate.



—Washington Star

CHAPLAIN JOSEPH TURNER

But there is something more underlying. Archbishop Joe Ryan of Anchorage, Alaska, who works with Cardinal Cook in the apostolate, points out that there are many thousands of personnel in the military who are not able to practice their religion properly because of this dire shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains. We can use, he says, 180 more Catholic priests — the number of slots that have been allocated for them.

Q: How do these shortages come about?

A: Various ways. Through attrition, through retirement, partially through the senseless up-or-out promotion system as applied to chaplains. The up-or-out system is when a chaplain fails to be promoted, say from captain to major, major to lieutenant colonel, then he will be booted out after two double passovers. You get a 90-day notice and severance pay and out you go, without even the concurrence of the denomination which approved you. No chaplains have been released because the churches sponsoring them have withdrawn their endorsements — at least none of the 400 or so that have been dismissed in the last 10 to 12 years. This is why we feel that chaplains are being hired as ministers but fired as soldiers — regardless of what it does to the faith balance. Some are veterans of the Vietnam War era and all have served from 10 to 17 years, and you wonder what price ministry after 10 years or so of dedicated service in the military.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RICK:

For your records,
files, etc.
Mr. Sanders has the
original.

Eleanor
8/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1978


To Ed Sanders

I am delighted that you will be available to serve as a Senior Advisor so that Secretary Vance and I will have the benefit of your wise counsel in a key foreign policy area. In your capacity as Senior Advisor, we would like you to focus on American policy with respect to the Middle East, and on the task of maintaining an open and productive dialogue with the American people, including the Congress and groups of interested citizens, on the Administration's policies in this area.

In the course of your duties, you will be working closely with other senior members of the Administration involved in the making of Middle East policy, including Secretary Vance and me. Your counsel and recommendations in connection with these matters will be valuable to Secretary Vance and to me.

While you will be concentrating your attention on matters pertaining to the Middle East, Secretary Vance and I are pleased that you will also be available to advise us in other matters. I appreciate very much your accepting these important responsibilities, and want to assure you of my personal support for your endeavors.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Jimmy Carter". The signature is written in a cursive style, with the first name "Jimmy" and the last name "Carter" clearly legible.

Mr. Ed Sanders
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Fritz
by info
J

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GIRAFFE QUESTION

by George W. Ball

August 9, 1978

During the Second World War, a Bloomsbury intellectual named Geoffrey Pyke, who was one of Lord Mountbatten's famous "Backroom Boys," devised several imaginative projects for advancing the allied cause. But, though his proposals were endorsed by both Roosevelt and Churchill, the military and civilian bureaucracy in Washington treated him with disdain. When he asked his Scottish assistant why he provoked such fierce obstructionism, the aide replied: "You're like a child, Pyke. When its parents say: 'That's a giraffe,' the child responds 'Why?' People can't stand that kind of question."

I thought of this incident while America was mired down in Vietnam. At the upper reaches of our government the giraffe question, "Why?", put everyone off; it deflected attention from the only legitimate question: "How?" How could we compel the North Vietnamese to give up and go home? How could we best use our vast resources to win the war? As a result of this narrow focus, policies were not based on an incisive exploration of America's interests, but evolved haphazardly in reaction to operational problems and the fluctuating barometer of domestic politics.

Until recently our policies toward the Arab-Israeli conflict have been shaped largely in the same manner. Overwhelmed by the intensity of political passion, we have made little systematic effort to ask what is best for our country. Why should we take one course as against another? Why should we accept as fact slogans, catch words and dogmatic assertions no matter how often or how vehemently repeated?

We can no longer afford to shun the hard discipline of skeptical inquiry. With an extraordinary chance for peace fast slipping away and a critical area of the world drifting toward destructive conflict, we owe it to ourselves to subject the unstated assumptions of American policy to the clinical challenge of the giraffe question, "Why?"

What are those assumptions?

The first assumption is that the national interests of the United States are precisely congruent with Israel's interests (as defined by whatever Israeli Government may at the time hold power). But no two nations can have identical national interests with regard to the whole range of their international relationships. Divergences are particularly wide when nations differ as sharply as do the United States and Israel in the physical facts of size, geographical position, population, economic strength, military might and international responsibility, as well as in the subjective elements of history, religious background and national purpose.

The nation of Israel was established to provide a national identity for a dispersed people who, surviving unprecedented hardships, have maintained their integrity through excruciating travail for centuries. Inhabiting a tiny enclave surrounded by peoples of different religion and culture and with a history of bitter antagonisms, Israelis have understandably developed a siege mentality. Obsessively preoccupied with the question of survival, they view even that issue on a day-to-day basis.

We Americans cannot limit our attention to a single issue; we must reconcile a number of conflicting imperatives. Though our commitment to Israel's survival is an unchallengeable component of our policy in the Middle East, it is by no means the only component. With interests and obligations all over the world, we cannot ignore our relations with one hundred million Arabs, our strategic competition with the Soviet Union, our responsibilities to our Western allies, or our need -- and that of other non-Communist nations -- for Middle East oil. We cannot let ourselves be drawn into actions or situations that contravene our national principles or permit our interests and commitments to get out of balance.

The United States Senate implicitly recognized that our interests diverged from the Israeli Government's perception of its own interests when it decided -- against that government's strong objections -- not to block the sale of F-15s to Saudi Arabia. In view of the fact that the Saudis could obtain more effective offensive weapons from France, it was clear, in spite of the rhetoric, that Israel's security worries were not the central issue, but, rather, the fear of its leaders that America's developing relations with Saudi Arabia might diffuse and thus weaken Israel's unique claim to America's support. The majority of the Senate, on the other hand, regarded America's growing friendship with the Saudis as advantageous both to the United States and to Israel, since we could never effectively promote

a peace settlement without the confidence and friendship of the moderate Arab states.

Yet peace is -- and must necessarily be -- the prime objective of America's policy toward the Middle East, and the sense of urgency with which we view the problem puts us crosswise with some -- though by no means all -- Israeli leaders who do not believe a peace settlement to be worth the costs and risks of relinquishing territory. They believe -- and that is the second assumption to be examined -- that the present situation can, if necessary, be continued indefinitely.

Today the central obstacle to peace is the quarrel over Palestine and the Palestinians; once that is resolved, the solution of other problems should be relatively easy. The security anxieties implicit in a Sinai withdrawal can be resolved by demilitarization, a monitoring system and an agreement that each side will restrain its forces along distantly separated lines. The menace of the Golan Heights -- which, like the Sinai Desert, is of modest economic importance -- can be neutralized by demilitarization and the interposition of a neutral force. Jerusalem, so heavily charged with religious and historical symbolism, is a cloudy conundrum; yet, if all other questions can first be disposed of, it should be possible to find a Jerusalem compromise in the context of an overall settlement.

But the Palestinian issue is by far the knottiest, and it is unlikely ever to be solved so long as Israel's leaders

believe they can permanently count on huge American subsidies. Such subsidies are crucial, since without them Israel could not continue to maintain herself as a garrison state. It is only with massive aid from America that she is now able -- at great cost to her civilian economy -- to spend 40 percent of her Gross National Product on security, including the expense of occupying extensive Arab lands.

Aid is now pouring in at an average rate of over \$5 million a day from the American public sector and perhaps another \$2 million a day from our private sector -- or, in total, about \$1,000 a year for every Israeli man, woman, and child. The need for that subsidy is likely to increase as the demographic balance shifts more heavily against Israel.

It is illusory to believe that the Arab nations bordering Israel, which include at least 47 million people, will ever accept such an unnatural arrangement as a permanent state of affairs. Without a political settlement, the dynamics of Arab politics will, sooner or later, impel those states to seek a solution by force, as gnawing frustration opens the door for radical leaders, while Arab self-confidence increases in pace with expanding wealth and military power.

Ever since 1967 Israelis have been in such internal disagreement as to what to do with the occupied territories that the situation has been left on dead-center. But with the Sadat initiative and rising American pressure, movement finally became

necessary. Last December the Begin Government came forward with a proposal for what they called "administrative autonomy" or "self-rule." Under that proposal, Palestinians on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip would participate in the management of their day-to-day local affairs. They would be given the option of becoming either Jordanian or Israeli citizens. Meanwhile, Israelis would have a complete laissez-passer to settle in the West Bank, which means that Israel's most grandiose settlement plans could go full-steam ahead.

The proposal did not offer an end to domination by the Israeli army; on the contrary, without the continued "stationing of armed forces" to control "security and public order," the plan would, Mr. Begin explained, be "meaningless." So the Palestinians responded with the obvious rhetorical question: "So what's new?" The Israeli army would remain. Palestinians would still have no right to organize or to express their views as to their own political future; that would endanger "security and public order."

Begin's proposal, in the form suggested, could never satisfy Palestinian aspirations or be accepted by any Arab state; it could have meaning only as an initial Israeli bargaining position. But the refusal of the Israeli Government to promise anything more than that Israel would "discuss" the "sovereignty" of the area after a five-year period leaves matters at an impasse.

The emphasis on "sovereignty" reflects Prime Minister Begin's mystical conception that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (which he refers to as "Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District")

belong to Israel because the territory was included in the ancient Kingdom of Israel. No matter that never in history did the borders of any state dominated by the Jews coincide exactly with the borders of post-1967 Israel. No matter that the Jews lost control of the territory about two thousand years ago or that, since the beginning of recorded history, it has been controlled at different times by Syrians, Babylonians, Canaanites, Persians, Greeks, Egyptians, Romans, Muslim Arabs, Christian Crusaders, Mamelukes and Ottoman Turks.

But, apart from a claim unrecognized for two millennia, the Palestine predicament cannot -- and should not -- be regarded as a dispute over real estate, but as a question of the rights and aspirations of the inhabitants of the territory. One and a quarter million Palestinians live in the area and many have lived there for a long time, while there are only a tiny handful of Israelis, most of whom have settled there in the last ten years, in violation of the Geneva Convention.

Apart from trying to keep hold of the territory through military means, what plans does the Israeli Government have for the area? Annexation? That, after all, was the campaign program of Mr. Begin's Likud Party. But how could that be reconciled with demographic and political realities?

To include the West Bank and the Gaza Strip within Israel would add one million and a quarter Arabs to the Israeli population. With almost a half-million Arabs already in Israel

the country would, thus, become one-third Arab, and since the Arabs could be expected to vote as a bloc, the raison d'être of Israel as a Jewish National home would be critically jeopardized. Nor would that be more than a foreshadowing of the imbalance to come. With emigration now exceeding immigration, the Jewish population of Israel is expanding annually at a rate of less than 2 percent, while the Palestinian population increases at 3.1 percent; so, barring major population shifts, there would be as many Arabs as Jews by 1990.

Thus, to keep control of a "greater Israel" that incorporated the occupied territories, the Israelis would either have to adopt apartheid and disenfranchise the Arab population or try to compel West Bank Arabs to go elsewhere. Though no one officially admits this latter objective, General Ariel Sharon, the Minister of Agriculture in charge of the settlement program, has made broad hints in that direction. Two million Jewish-Israelis, he announced some months ago, would be settled in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem within the next thirty years. That would be possible, he told me when I met him last April, because by the turn of the century, there would be altogether 4.2 million Jewish-Israelis (lower than the prediction of 6 to 8 million he had made in September, 1977). But, by a simple extrapolation, there would, I suggested, be an additional million Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. What did he intend to do with them? He offered no comment.

I do not believe that many Israelis think it feasible to force many Arabs out of the West Bank. Nor would they wish to, in view of the economic disruption it would create in Israel itself, where West Bank Arabs serve as less-skilled labor. But the Israeli settlement policy, especially when administered by a zealot like Sharon, reinforces Arab suspicions of Israeli expansionist intentions. Can anyone imagine the Arab nations peacefully accepting a further swelling of the Palestinian diaspora, or the violent terrorist response it would provoke?

If annexation is not feasible, and the Palestinians cannot be forced out, what is Israel's long-term policy toward the occupied areas? So far as I can tell, it is a non-policy -- to do nothing. Immobilized by apprehension and ambition, many Israeli leaders sustain themselves by the wistful hope that, with America's unquestioning support, time will somehow work to Israel's advantage. Yet, with the Arabs getting both richer and proportionally more numerous, I find such optimism neither prudent nor rational.

Can we Americans, in fact, be counted on to send Israel huge annual subsidies of money and weapons, regardless of the actions and policies or inactions and non-policies of the Israeli Government? If some Israelis take for granted an affirmative answer, it is because our politicians have formed the bad habit of speaking to Israel not in the language of diplomacy but of courtship. Our last five Presidents, our Secretaries of State, Senators, Congressmen, Governors, Mayors and candidates for sheriff and city council on pre-election pilgrimages, have felt compelled to declaim, as Secretary Vance has done, that

"our commitment to the security of Israel is clear and unequivocal, and we will continue to provide to Israel what is necessary to preserve it." We will, they have insisted, never "bring pressure" on Israel or try to change her position, never try to "impose" a settlement; never stop our aid or cease our wholehearted support for Israeli security. America, they have implied, will be at Israel's side with arms and a large check, no matter what actions Israel may take or fail to take and regardless of the consequences for America's larger economic or political interests.

The Israeli reply to this exuberant commitment has been equally stylized. Even were the United States to withdraw her aid, Israel would fight on. She will never be moved by American pressure; in fact, such pressure would have a negative effect. The Israeli people, after all, are engaged in a life-and-death struggle; they should not be asked to yield tangible territory merely for an Arab promise of peace which can be violated or withdrawn.

If we are to avoid a serious misunderstanding with Israel, we must stop this stilted dialogue, after first sorting out its fundamental contradictions. No matter what our politicians may say, no responsible American government can commit itself to unqualified support for another country without a substantial assurance as to how that country intends to behave. But Israel has insisted on full freedom of action. Within a little more than a decade, she launched two major military operations

without advance warning to the United States and she has given us little but doubletalk regarding her possession of a nuclear weapon.

In the circumstances, can we offer an unqualified assurance of support without at least an agreement for advance consultation? Were Israel today, in the midst of peace discussions, to launch another preemptive strike against its neighbors, would we automatically mount another United States airlift? If Israel were to use -- or even threaten to use -- a nuclear weapon, would we reflexively back her up?

To talk as though the United States will forever play the ever-forgiving big brother is a disservice to Israel. Most Israelis, I am confident, understand that, although one cannot be sure about Prime Minister Begin. When Golda Meir warned him at the time of the Rogers initiative in June 1970 that, if Israel were not more responsive, we Americans would stop sending arms, he disdainfully replied, as she quotes in her memoirs: "What do you mean we won't get arms? We'll demand them from the Americans."

Let me be quite clear on this point: I am not suggesting that our aid is excessive; we should not hesitate to provide even more if it contributes to peace. But, so long as Israel's inflexibility on the Palestinian issue threatens to defeat all peace

efforts, can American aid be counted on without regard to the consequences?

Israel's position confronts us Americans with puzzling problems.

The first is moral and political: How do we justify subsidizing and politically supporting a situation which contravenes two principles of world order we have most assiduously advanced?

Fundamental to a stable world order is the principle that no nation should be permitted to aggrandize itself by military force -- which means, as was said by the Department of State at the time of the Rogers proposals, that "changes in the boundary lines" existing prior to 1967, "should not reflect the weight of conquest."

An equally firm American tenet since the days of Woodrow Wilson (and one which constitutes a stated purpose of the United Nations Charter) is that all peoples should be entitled to the right of self-determination.

Israel could justify a temporary occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an act of self-defense. But occupation has now lasted for eleven years. Can such a colonial anachronism be justified as a more or less permanent state of affairs?

These matters of principle must particularly trouble those for whom human rights have become the ^{CRITICAL EMPHASIS} ~~subordinate~~ of American foreign policy. Yet, in terms of realpolitik, there

is also an insistent question: How long should we continue to subsidize Israeli policies that stand in the way of peace and thus may lead both the Israelis and ourselves to disaster?

If Israel persists in its occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and offers no assurance of self-determination to the Palestinians, she may well be passing the point of no return on the road to war. Sadat has been flailing around erratically and, if he is finally forced to admit the bankruptcy of his peace initiative, he may either resign or encourage the other Arab states to join in a long-term buildup for a military solution, as Nasser did after 1967. Though Israel now has an overwhelming military superiority, it would be folly to assume that Egypt and Syria, with their advantage in raw manpower, could not, over the next three or four years, enlist the help of other Arab nations and the financial assistance of Saudi Arabia to build a formidable force. As that process became visible Israel might very well launch a preemptive strike.

No matter who emerged victorious, another Middle Eastern war would be costly for all participants, while endangering the security and stability of the whole non-Communist world. If Israel were winning and the Soviets in their new aggressive mood decided that, rather than accept the humiliation of another Arab client state, they would drop one or more paratroop divisions in Syria, how, then, would America react? Or, if the Arabs threatened Israel's borders, would we send our planes and troops?

Nor are the possibilities of direct military involvement and a broadening conflict the only dangers we would face. Another

war would almost certainly force the Saudis, Kuwaitis, Algerians and the Emirates to impose an oil embargo that could shake apart the already fragile economic structure of the West.

America, thus, has an enormous stake in Middle East developments and our government would be irresponsible if it did not fully use its leverage with both sides to try to break the current stalemate, rather than sit by quietly while the immobilisme that envelopes Middle East politics leads to a catastrophic collision.

But how can one reconcile such intervention with the fourth assumption -- that the United States should never try to "impose" a settlement?

What a tendentious formulation! Even if we wished to do so, we could not "impose" a settlement on either side short of sending our army, which is manifestly preposterous.

Israel, as a sovereign power, is entitled to pursue any line of policy she chooses, even though, in our judgment, it might be a prescription for disaster. But our country is also a sovereign power with national interests we must safeguard by whatever means we deem necessary. One key aspect of our sovereignty is the right to decide how we shall spend our resources -- a decision that can be made only through our own political processes and not by any other government.

Our government is charged with employing our resources to advance our own national interests -- including helping our friends -- but it would have no business spending those resources

to assist another nation -- no matter how friendly -- to pursue policies that, in its judgment, would threaten damage to our interests as well as to those of our friends.

What, then, can we properly ask the Israelis to do? To withdraw from the occupied areas would, they contend, require them to yield tangible territory for intangible promises; that would be unfair and asymmetrical, since promises can be broken, while territory -- once relinquished -- is retrievable only through military means.

That argument would carry more weight if Israel's military occupation did not offend international principles, which recognize the right of self-determination and oppose the occupation of territory against the will of the inhabitants. The widespread recognition of those principles confers on Israel the heavy burden of proving why, in her special case, they should not be applied -- why, in her special case, three million people are entitled to impose their army on one and a quarter million of their neighbors.

That justification must rest, if at all, not on any esoteric claim to sovereignty but on an irrefutable showing that withdrawal would pose a critical peril to Israel -- which brings us to the fifth assumption: That Israel needs to control the West Bank and Gaza Strip for her own safety. That is the hard center of the problem, for, since we have promised to safeguard Israel's security, we cannot in good faith urge any settlement that would expose her to worse dangers, in the long run, than those she now faces.

When Israel first overran the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, she announced that she did not intend to retain that territory permanently, and a year later, when I was United States Ambassador to the United Nations, the Israeli Government authorized me to tell King Hussein that, if he would negotiate a peace settlement, "a part, if not all, of the West Bank would be returned to Jordan." At that time, unhappily, King Hussein was too concerned at possible retribution from Nasser to make a separate peace or break the common Arab front against direct negotiations with Israel. It was another example of a lack of phasing between leaders and events that have made the Middle East a synonym for frustration. Now -- a decade later -- when Egyptians are urging a settlement that might return the West Bank to Hussein, the Israeli Government is led by a man who claims the West Bank as Israel's sovereign territory and who, even as early as 1967 fiercely declared, "no evacuation -- even with peace."

How strong is Israel's security case for retaining the West Bank? The argument most often cited is that Arab control of the West Bank would put enemy guns within reach of Tel Aviv, while Arab tanks could cut the country in two by driving merely nine miles to the sea. In Jerusalem, Mr. Begin's custom is to take his visitors to the window and show them how near are the lights of neighboring Arab villages.

Physical depth is a traditional factor in military calculations and, given the persistence of terrorist raids, Israeli apprehensions are understandable. Yet, in view of the exiguous distances

involved, the doctrine of defense in depth is scarcely applicable -- particularly in this age of supersonic jets, surface-to-surface missiles, and hand-held missiles which enable one man to neutralize the heaviest tank. Even if Israel should continue to occupy the West Bank, no Israeli town could be safe from SCUD B missiles, which have an effective range of 175 miles, or from supersonic planes that can reach Israel in thirty minutes from any of the existing Arab air bases. Moreover, Israel's highly competent intelligence service could detect any West Bank buildup well in advance.

Geography, after all, is only a tactical -- and subordinate -- aspect of the issue of security. So long as there is no peace, Israel will never be fully secure, no matter how much real estate she continues to hold. It is illusory to think that, if the chance for peace is missed, three million Israelis can forever hold out through physical might against the whole phalanx of Arab nations with their 150 million people, or -- if that seems overstated -- at least stand off the 50 million people of the front-line nations, whose wealth and access to technology are constantly increasing, who possess strategic depth in significant dimensions and who are driven to collective action by a common and festering grievance.

Underlying the argument that Israel needs the West Bank for her security is the assumption that withdrawal from that territory would inevitably deliver the area to the most extreme elements in the PLO who would turn to the Soviets for assistance.

At this point, the giraffe question becomes particularly pertinent. Why? Is that really true?

Today the inhabitants of the West Bank want an end of the Israeli occupation, but that does not mean that they wish to be governed by PLO extremists. Their problem is that now there is nothing they can say or do about it. That Israeli soldiers on the West Bank suppress any political organization or expression that might challenge the existing order is, of course, to be expected; a benign military occupation is a contradiction in terms. Individuals living under occupation have little choice but to support whatever organized group speaks for them. That necessarily means the PLO, since the Israelis have prevented the Palestinians from creating any alternative organization in the occupied territories. They refused permission, for example, when the moderate mayor of Hebron proposed to call a conference of Arab representatives from other West Bank towns so as to establish an Arab organization more moderate than the PLO.

Thus, if the PLO is the only instrument for the expression of Palestinian nationalism, the Israelis have made it so. And, though it includes some relatively moderate elements, their voices have inevitably been drowned out by the more radical. That does not mean that the majority of West Bank inhabitants -- or even most members of the PLO -- are extremists, but so long as they are denied the right to participate in discussions as to their own future, they feel increasingly frustrated and angry.

It is instructive to listen to educated, intelligent Palestinians in the West Bank: "No one will talk with us; we are

totally ignored in negotiations over our own area. You ask why our extremists perpetrate outrages? It is to attract attention. Do you think governments would even be discussing our problems were it not for these acts of violence? You are making us all psychotics and we don't want to be psychotics. We want a chance to explain our position, to be listened to, to have a voice in our own future."

Two sources of discontent are reflected in the activities of the PLO, the desire of those Palestinians who now live -- or lived before occupation -- in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to choose their own rulers free from Israeli domination and the irredentist feelings of those Palestinian families uprooted three decades ago from what is now the state of Israel. Though the first group primarily seeks withdrawal from the occupied territories, the second group, Israelis fear, would be content with nothing less than the total destruction of Israel or its transformation into a secular state. Thus, they contend, even the creation of an independent Palestine would not mean an enduring peace.

While that argument cannot be casually rejected, history would suggest a different analysis. Experience has repeatedly shown that when peaceful political expression and organization are forbidden in an occupied territory, the resistance movement is likely to be captured by its most extreme elements. When Palestine was under the British mandate, Israeli resistance was expressed through acts of terrorism by the Irgun under

Menachem Begin. When the Nazi occupying forces and their Vichy stooges suppressed the political opposition in France, the Communists came close to capturing the Resistance. Yet, once the state of Israel was established and the British withdrew from Palestine, moderate Israelis formed a government and the Irgun was absorbed into the Herut party. Once free political expression and organization were permitted in France, the moderates gained control.

Though the PLO was organized in 1964, it did not become a serious autonomous body until after the West Bank was overrun in the 1967 War and if, in exchange for a promise of self-determination, the PLO were to agree that any resulting government would commit itself to live in peace with Israel, respect her boundaries and recognize her vital interests, the remnants of the resistance movement would be likely to wither away. Meanwhile, we face the traditional diplomatic puzzle of how to get from here to there. Israel refuses to negotiate with the PLO on the ground that the language of its National Covenant denounces the state of Israel as "entirely illegal." Meanwhile, PLO leaders refuse to amend that covenant to recognize Israel's legitimacy in advance of negotiations.

The PLO is a large tent housing widely disparate elements and to keep it from impotent fragmentation its leaders dare not risk a break with the extremists of their group by yielding in advance what they regard as their only bargaining counter.

Thus, the classical impasse between peoples who do not trust one another: Neither will make the first move.

Such an impasse should not, in my view, have been permitted to develop, nor should it be allowed to continue. Many times in history contending nations have negotiated peace with their enemies while a state of belligerency prevailed, so that each remained publicly committed to the destruction of the other. The important question is not the initial bargaining positions of the parties but the commitments they undertake as part of a final settlement. It seems highly doubtful that the Palestinian people would willingly accept any settlement reached through a negotiation in which the PLO were denied at least some role.

The irony of the PLO predicament is that the violent acts which frustration has led its more extreme elements to perpetrate in order to attract attention have now made an independent Palestinian state appear as a potential source of danger to its neighbors. That danger has, in fact, been so insistently emphasized as to lead even Egypt to speak with favor of restoring some measure of Jordanian control and blocking the emergence of an independent Palestine. But such an expression of preference primarily reflects Sadat's desire to improve Hussein's position and please the United States, rather than any deep concern about the issue, since Egypt is not contiguous to the West Bank. Nor is the Saudi position on this question at all clearly articulated.

To prejudge that issue would, it seems to me, be a mistake. It might be that, after a period of free political expression, the

people of the West Bank would elect to return to Jordanian control -- or at least federation -- but that should be their own decision and we should not limit their options. Defending the principle of self-determination, Woodrow Wilson insisted that "no peace can last or ought to last which does not accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed," and, he added, "no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."

If Israel does ever agree to a negotiation in which Palestinian interests are represented -- though perhaps not solely represented -- by PLO spokesmen, it will be only because we have found new ways of meeting her security concerns. One proposal frequently made is that we sign a formal defense treaty. But the United States has never given any nation a security guarantee that was fully self-executing. The farthest we have gone is in the North Atlantic Treaty, yet even that does not, by its terms, require the automatic commitment of forces as did the Pact of Steel between Hitler and Mussolini; it merely commits each party to take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force." The importance of the North Atlantic Treaty is not so much its language but the fact that it is an integral part of a total collective security arrangement which involves a high degree of consultation and cooperation among the parties -- a relationship the Israelis have so far resolutely resisted. Finally, what gives our European partners the greatest sense of assurance is the visible presence of American combat troops in the area,

Israel's reluctance to base its security on the necessarily qualified language of an American defense treaty is understandable -- particularly since we failed to move incisively enough in 1967 to fulfill the implied promise Secretary Dulles had made ten years earlier that the Strait of Tiran would be kept open as an international waterway. But, as our NATO experience has demonstrated, a defense commitment reinforced by a visible American military presence is far more persuasive than mere language on a piece of paper. That then may furnish a clue as to how we can provide Israel with a sufficient sense of security to agree to a settlement involving substantial withdrawal from the occupied territories. Before the present peace efforts finally break down, we should be prepared to offer a proposal incorporating three major elements -- a defense treaty, systematic consultation and an American military presence.

We might, for example, as part of a final settlement, offer to establish an air base in the West Bank, where it could contribute to the local economy and stand as a symbol of America's interest in the area. Alternatively, we might consider a naval base in Israel or an airbase in the Gaza Strip or the Sinai, or some combination of the three.

Though such bases would be established primarily for America's strategic purposes (as a counter, for example, to new Soviet bases in Ethiopia and South Yemen), they would have available a stockpile of replacement parts and material that could obviate need for another airlift.

American commitment

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan would, it seems to me, find such a proposal comforting, since it would provide a tangible warning to the Russians. Though there might be some problems with the Syrians, an Israeli willingness to relinquish the West Bank should, it seems to me, go far to make it palatable.

If the objection were made that neighboring Arab states might regard a defense treaty with Israel as a hostile act, the treaty could be drafted as a guarantee of finally agreed boundaries rather than as a specific security pledge to only one of the parties to the quarrel.

Added to all this would, of course, be the normal machinery of security -- the creation of certain small buffer areas, the interposition of neutral forces, and so on.

Some, of course, may object that the establishment of forward bases would involve us too deeply in the affairs of a disturbed and violent area. Yet today -- whether we like it or not -- our vital interests and responsibilities are deeply and inescapably affected by Middle Eastern developments over which we have little, if any, control. What the establishment of bases might provide us -- by encouraging Israeli flexibility and a willingness to concert policy -- is some ability to influence the tide of events rather than merely respond complaisantly to the actions and decisions of other governments. That is the only fitting posture for a great power -- to be the master of its destiny, not an innocent bystander.

Obviously, it is difficult for a mere voyeur to suggest moves in the exchanges our government is currently conducting with the Israelis and Egyptians. Nor is there much value in discussing a speculative course of events one might ideally wish to foresee. With these caveats, however, I would hope that assurances provided through the prospect of an American presence might make it possible for Israel to accept Palestinian spokesmen in a discussion looking toward a process of settlement somewhat along the following lines:

1. Israeli troops in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be phased out and be replaced -- or, at least, diluted -- by substantial neutral forces, while the areas would be placed under a neutral administration for a preparatory period of five years.

2. During those five years, the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would be given the opportunity to organize politically, not merely for local elections but for an ultimate plebiscite to determine how and by whom they wished to be governed.

3. If that plebiscite should call for an independent Palestinian entity, that entity would be required -- as a condition to taking power -- to commit itself: (1) to de jure recognition of the state of Israel; (2) to agree to respect Israel's territorial integrity and to renounce any and all discrimination against her; and (3) finally -- following the Japanese pattern -- to agree to effective demilitarization except for a small force just sufficient to enable the new government to maintain internal order.

These proposals are not without flaws and drawbacks, but they might offer a chance for a peace which is, it seems to me, the only condition in which Israel can ever hope to achieve lasting security.

None of this can come about, however, until the United States is able to persuade Israel that the present situation is untenable-- that Israel's neighbors will not allow her to continue forever imposing a military occupation over the more than a million Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Nor should she be permitted by American friends to believe that we will continue indefinitely subsidizing a situation that not only cuts across established American principles but can, in the long run, lead to a disaster, not merely for Israel but for America and the other non-Communist nations.

[illegible]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


August 9, 1978

To De Jongh Franklin


I appreciate your kind note and understand your desire to return to law practice.

I am grateful for your contributions to my Administration. Your early friendship and hard work in my behalf have been, and will continue to be, important to me and Rosalynn. We will miss you and Phoebe...

Sincerely,

Jimmy

You've done a great job - Thanks!



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 7, 1978

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. President:


Subject to your approval, I think I should return to my law practice, and I would like to do so effective October 1, 1978.

I will, of course, continue to do anything I can for you, and since I will no longer be "Hatched," I look forward to being useful to the Democratic National Committee and to your re-election committee when it is formed.

I will always be grateful to you and Rosalynn for giving me the opportunity to have worked in the White House. I could not be more proud of you both for the high standards and the moral inspiration you have given to the nation and to the world. I will always be pleased to serve in any way that you ask.

I hope it will be possible for us to talk briefly before I leave. Phoebe joins me in expressing our appreciation and we know that your leadership will continue to be effective for the nation's good.

Sincerely,



DeLoach Franklin

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

ID 784111

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DATE: 07 AUG 78

FOR ACTION: HAMILTON JORDAN

FRANK MOORE (LES FRANCIS)

JIM MCINTYRE

INFO-ONLY: THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SECRET BRZEZINSKI MEMO RE ARMS SALE TO IRAN

+++++
+ RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052) +
+ BY: 1200 PM WEDNESDAY 09 AUG 78 +
+++++

ACTION REQUESTED:

STAFF RESPONSE: () I CONCUR. () NO COMMENT. () HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:

~~SECRET~~

*J. should
you should
read this*

*I agree with ~~that~~ of
an Frank Moore. We do not
have the political capital
to expend on another controversial
f.p. issue now. To do so would
be at the expense of other things
more important to us.*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

August 3, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Cyrus Vance *ckv*

Subject: F-4 Aircraft and Anti-Radiation
Missiles for Iran

Following the July 5 Policy Review Committee meeting, you approved 31 F-4E aircraft and 1,000 SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles for sale to Iran.

The Shah asked for reconsideration of this decision. Iran is seeking, at a minimum, inclusion of additional wiring in the F-4E aircraft so that they can later be converted at a minimum cost and delay to the F-4G "Wild Weasel" configuration. (Wild Weasel is a general term for electronic warfare aircraft designed to locate and destroy surface-to-air and anti-aircraft artillery radar sites.)

These 31 aircraft are part of a \$9 billion package of long-term Iranian equipment requirements that was transmitted to us by Iran last December. We are now reviewing this package and will be sending a State-Defense team in early fall to consult with Iran on our findings and their priorities.

I do not believe we should agree to provide this capability to Iran. ACDA shares this view. I have discussed this issue with Harold Brown. We do not agree, and he will send you a separate memorandum.

I base my recommendations on the following considerations:

Military Needs

Our estimate is that, even without Wild Weasel, Iran could defeat an attack by Iraq at this time.

~~SECRET~~GDS*Jay 10/17/90*

~~SECRET~~

While the Iraqi air defense system is expected to be formidable in the mid-1980s, Iran would still possess the necessary capability to defeat it, if at a higher cost.

Congressional Reaction

Congressional reaction would clearly be sharply negative to a reversal of your original decision. If, as some are proposing, we add special wiring to the F-4, many in Congress will see this as practically the same as committing to the later sale of a full Wild Weasel capability. If we did notify to Congress either the F-4 with special wiring or the F-4G itself, Congress would probably go along but it would involve us in another AWACS-type debate. Sales to Iran involving the security of particularly sensitive technology and the provision of an offensive capability is not something we should undertake to do battle on with Congress at this time.

Conventional Arms Transfer Policy

You have already approved the sale of SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles. This in itself constitutes an exception to the policy against introduction of new capabilities into a region. To go beyond that to provide the F-4G or wiring for later conversion to the F-4G without totally compelling reasons to do so would raise new questions at home and abroad about the seriousness of our policy of restraint.

Foreign Policy Considerations

The Shah has said that acquisition of Wild Weasel capability is most important to him, and he will be very disappointed if we are unwilling to release that capability. Nevertheless, we are approving a substantial number of new cases for Iran and will be consulting on the full range of his requests with the Shah in the fall. Both actions demonstrate our continuing interest in our military supply relationship. In any event, we have already conveyed your original decision to the Shah. Changing our position now risks giving him the impression that we are easily swayed.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

Recommendation

That you reconfirm your decision to offer to Iran 31 F-4E aircraft, without wiring provision for later conversion to the F-4G Wild Weasel configuration, and 1,000 SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles.

Additionally, that we inform the Shah we will be prepared to readdress this issue at a date in the future when the introduction of Wild Weasel technology would not appear to create the serious problem inherent in the transfer of this advanced technology.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
3 AUG 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: F-4s to Iran

Iran has requested 31 F-4G radar suppression aircraft with 214 STANDARD ARM anti-radiation missiles to compensate for the vulnerability of its aircraft to modern surface-to-air missiles and radar guided anti-aircraft artillery. Secretary Vance and I agree that Iran need not be offered such a sophisticated capability at this time; we further agree that Iran should be offered 31 F-4E aircraft together with 1000 SHRIKE anti-radiation missiles to provide a less sophisticated anti-radiation capability. We disagree, however, as to whether so-called "Group A" wiring should be included. Such wiring would in itself provide no additional capability, but would in the future allow economic conversion of the aircraft to the F-4G configuration by adding the more advanced anti-radiation equipment requested by the Shah. Any such conversion would not be automatic but would require a separate decision by the USG that circumstances had changed sufficiently to make that conversion appropriate.

The Shah has rejected F-4s without Group A wiring. He has said he would accept the aircraft with such wiring although he would prefer now to have the F-4G. My judgment is that in terms of our international military-political interests it is advantageous to be forthcoming with respect to the Shah's curtailed request.

Moreover, the following military, economic, and technical factors seem to me persuasive in favor of providing Iran with the Group A wiring. First, as noted, Group A wiring provides no additional capability beyond that which we have already agreed to provide, nor are there security risks associated with technology transfer comprised in the wiring. Indeed the JCS have determined that the F-4G technology itself would be substantially releasable at this time and the Air Force has reached the same conclusion in a separate review under National Disclosure Policy procedures.

Second, Iran will have a legitimate military requirement at some time in the future for F-4G aircraft and STANDARD ARM missiles to counter increasingly sophisticated enemy air defenses. Iraq, for example, is acquiring more modern SAM and AAA weapons, with their associated radars and electronic warfare systems. At that later time we will be in a situation where both the military requirement for and the acceptability of technology transfer of the F-4G/STANDARD ARM capability will be at hand. Such a capability would then be very important to Iran. Though I am not prepared to say that without it Iran would be defeated by Iraq, I do not believe that such a criterion has been or should be the one used for individual transfers.

Classified by ASD/ISA
Subject to General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652. Automatically Downgraded
at two year intervals, Declassified on 31 Dec 86.

~~SECRET~~JAN 10/17/90
SEC DEF CONTR No. X-2300

Third, failure to provide the Group A wiring now would make later retrofit with that F-4G capability prohibitively expensive at that time - about \$4M per aircraft.

Fourth, from an arms-transfer standpoint, provision of the Group A wiring is consistent with Administration policy. The appropriate comparison is not with the anti-radiation systems of others in the region (although the Soviet Union and Israel have such systems comparable to the F-4G) but with the systems against which the capability is directed. As I have indicated, Iraq's present SAM and AAA capability certainly justifies Iran's acquisition of the relatively primitive anti-radiation capability provided by the F-4E with SHRIKE, and Iraq will in due course improve these systems. Inclusion of A-wiring should thus properly be seen as a prudent hedge for Iran against an increasingly sophisticated enemy threat.

Finally, there is a need for urgency in making this decision. The contractor is already funding long lead items to keep open the F-4 production line and has told us he will not continue doing so after October 1, 1978, without a firm commitment from the USG for further purchases. The F-4 sale probably falls within those "potentially controversial" sales for which we have promised Congress 50 in-session days to consider. Taking into account the Labor Day recess, we should notify any sale to the Congress by the end of next week.

Harold Brown

12:20 PM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 8, 1978

MEETING WITH RUDOLF NUREYEV AND BERYL GREY

Wednesday, August 9, 1978

12:20 p.m. (5 minutes)

The Oval Office

From: Jack Watson *Jan*

I. PURPOSE

Brief meeting and photo session.

II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS PLAN

A. Background

- (1) Rudolf Nureyev: Long considered the greatest danseur in the world, he was the first of a growing number of artists to defect from the Soviet Union. Prior to his defection in 1961, he was one of the principal danseurs of the Kirov Ballet in Leningrad. Although he has not become a member of any company, his closest professional association has been with the Royal Ballet; and it was at Covent Garden in 1962 that he began his legendary partnership with Dame Margot Fonteyn. He has made successful ventures into modern dance, but he remains dedicated to classical ballet and has danced with most of the world's leading ballerinas. No other artist has ever approached his worldwide public appearance schedule, which averages over 200 performances each year in addition to choreographic productions and films. He starred in the 1977 film biography, "Valentino."
- (2) Beryl Grey: Now in her tenth year as the first woman Artistic Director of the London Festival Ballet, she was the first British ballerina to achieve international status and played a major role in shaping the British ballet movement. She joined the Royal Ballet at 14 and was the first (and still only) dancer ever to attempt the dual lead in "Swan Lake" at the age of 15. She was the first Western ballerina to guest with the Bolshoi Ballet in Moscow (1957); and in 1964, she traveled to China where she danced with and directed the Peking Ballet. She has written two books about her experiences in these countries. In 1966, she retired from dancing to become Director General of the Arts Educational Schools, and received the CBE (Commander of the British Empire) from Queen Elizabeth in 1973.

- B. Participants: Rudolf Nureyev, Beryl Grey, and her husband, Dr. Sven Svenson.
- C. Press Plan: Photo session for the first two minutes. White House photographer; with photo release to the British press.

III. TALKING POINTS

1. The London Festival Ballet is at the end of its first American tour (New York and Washington) since 1952 and is currently in its final week at the Kennedy Center. You will be re-invited to attend one of the remaining performances.
2. During the private session after the photographer leaves, Mr. Nureyev will bring up the fact that he has tried unsuccessfully for many years to secure a visa from the Soviets for his mother to visit him in the West. He has not seen her since his defection 17 years ago. He is quite desperate because of her age and health and feels that, due to your interest in human rights and sympathy for the Soviet dissidents and their plight, you will be willing to aid his efforts on behalf of his mother. He will present you with a letter requesting your help and support. He would like this to remain a private matter between you until such time as you make a decision on his request.

NOTE: Pertinent articles on Mr. Nureyev are attached.



By Margaret Thomas—The Washington Post

Nureyev: "I'm here on earth to do things; I don't want to waste my life."

Stalking Rudolf Nureyev

There's an Air of Quest
About His Whole Career
And His Life as Well

By Alan M. Kriegsman

RUDOLF NUREYEV, dancer extraordinary, was attired for his Watergate suite interview in an olive-drab fatigue outfit—open shirt with epaulets, Greek seaman's cap, bloused trousers, boots. Amidst the deluxe surroundings, it was a reminder of his Russian upbringing in hunger-ridden poverty, his childhood home a single grubby room that housed three families.

The costume also seemed suited to his expression, which was part quizzical, part defiant. He'd been a scrapper, a rebel from the start—a troublemaker at the Kirov Ballet, the first of the defectors from Russia in 1961, and a persistently unconventional artist who used the freedom the West afforded him to continually break new ground.

Now he sat awaiting questions like a tiger lying in wait for prey, a jungle creature who enjoys sparring with an

Crosscurrents

adversary, guarding his flanks, pressing for advantage. Nureyev has developed an instinctive wariness; he's been through the media mill too many times not to be sensitive about traps. The innermost part of him retreats to a secret place, hidden entirely from view except for a stark stillness that sometimes envelops him.

Nureyev is not only a fighter but an eternal nomad. Born in a railway car in Mongolia 40 years ago, he has not stopped moving since. His passionate obsession with dance has become one of the modern legends of the art. There's been an air of quest about his whole career, and his life style as well—a Faustian yearning that pushes him

on and on in search of ever-beckoning, ever-shifting ideals.

In 1974, in a program entitled "Nureyev and Friends" at New York's Uris Theater, he danced 34 performances in a row, appearing in all four ballets of the program each time. This has increasingly become his normal pattern. Most recently, after a similar marathon at the Metropolitan Opera House, his whirlwind has landed him back in Washington, where he's appearing every evening and matinee for two weeks as guest artist with the London Festival Ballet at the Kennedy Center.

The just-concluding first week has been devoted to the latest of his innovative accomplishments—his own first full-length original ballet production, a version of "Romeo and Juliet" to the celebrated Prokofiev score that he created for the London troupe last year. Like everything else he's touched, it bears a distinctly personal stamp, in this case a rather grim aura of fatality that sets it apart from the many other ballet versions.

"I had hoped to do it for the Royal Ballet, about three or four years ago," he said. "I asked, why don't we take it to Paris and I'll dance it there. But they weren't buying it, and Paris, it seems, didn't want the Royal Ballet in their opera house. Anyway, I thought, I need a new romantic vehicle for myself, and I find the Cranko version unsatisfying; there's nothing to do but do one myself. I proposed to do it for the Berlin Opera Ballet, but they were considering the Lavrovsky production at the time. I think that is a very fine production, and felt the West should definitely see it.

"But they ended up doing another, different Russian production, so I missed my chance again. In the meantime, I had been reading many criticisms of the various 'Romeo and Juliet' ballets, I had re-read the play itself and was steeped in the Renaissance background of the drama, so I was very eager to bring forward my own ideas about it. Then the London Festival Ballet agreed to have me stage it. I did all the preliminary planning while I was shooting the 'Valentino' movie. Then we mounted the whole thing in five weeks of rehearsal."

Nureyev had very definite notions about emphasis and tone he wanted to convey. "The central thing," he said, "was the concept of fate, of chance, which ruled the lives of those people of Verona, who believed firmly in supernatural forces. Of course, I wanted to focus on the lovers, but I saw them racing not only toward each other, across the barriers of hatred that separated them, but also toward death.

"Death is an ever-present motif in Shakespeare's text. Three times in the course of the play, for instance, Juliet refers to death as her true spouse; in one scene she calls upon death, rather than Romeo, to take her maidenhead.

This, of course, was the source of my scene in the ballet where the apparition of death ravishes Juliet. It occurred to me too, about the poison in the play, there is the same love-death duality. Poison can be lethal, but it also has medicinal uses. The poison in the play brings death to the lovers, but it also unites the feuding families."

In an attempt to come closer to Shakespeare, Nureyev has also made Mercutio a much more complex and ambivalent character than in most other versions, and has given Benvolio more individuality as well. Romeo too, of course, came in for much rethinking.

"When I danced Romeo in the MacMillan version with the Royal Ballet," Nureyev recalled, "he had to be very straightforward. In that version he assimilates much of the character of Mercutio in the play—he's a winner, from the start, and as boisterous as his companions. But I saw him as a much weaker, more indecisive person, in the beginning at least, and this posed a difficult problem of making Romeo 'boring' but interesting at the same time. I felt I had to show his character developing, there had to be a progression, rather than presenting him full-blown right away."

The effects of this sort of cogitation impart to Nureyev's "Romeo and Juliet" the feeling that it is not just another romantic diversion, but more nearly a meditation on the universals of human love and conflict.

Just before the interview, Nureyev had been briefly glimpsed rehearsing in a Kennedy Center studio, not with one of the London Festival Ballet prima, but, surprisingly, with Gelsey Kirkland of American Ballet Theatre.

This was in preparation, he let on afterwards, for his September appearances at the Met with ABT in that company's production of "Don Quixote," staged by his no less celebrated compatriot, Mikhail Baryshnikov. Seeing Kirkland and Nureyev together, even in practice clothes, brought back to me memories of their magical first pairing, in the "Corsaire" pas de deux at an ABT gala in 1975. This in turn prompted curiosity about the chemistry of Nureyev's ballet partnerships in general. With Margot Fonteyn, for example, who once said of him, "Rudolph really made me believe I was a beautiful young princess, and that he loved me so much he'd die for me."

"With her that wasn't difficult," he said, flashing an involuntary smile. "But that kind of rapport doesn't come often. Yes, I have found it; with dancers like Lynn Seymour, Carla Fracci and Merle Park; it happened with Makarova, in 'Giselle'; with Pat Ruanne in my own 'Romeo and Juliet.'"

"With Cynthia Gregory, now that

was extraordinary! Physically and temperamentally we were so different. But in the 'Raymonda' I did with her, and recently, in 'Swan Lake' (which I'll do again with her at the Met next month), by sheer good will and desire, she made it work. The funny thing was, I'd always found her rather a cold person, but then suddenly such a warmth exuded from her it brought tears to your eyes."

With "Romeo and Juliet" behind him, Nureyev has a new ballet project simmering in his brain, and it came about through one of his Washington "connections." "The last time I was here, Rostropovich showed me a script he'd come by on Byron's 'Manfred' and said I must do it. I read it and didn't like it; I fought it at first, but then I kept coming back to it and finally came up with a new angle, a way I could do it, so I'm sort of planning that out now. Rostropovich said he'll conduct it anywhere I put it on."

The role of Byron's soul-wracked solitary and his flirtation with the demonic world would seem ideal for Nureyev. The movie screen may also yet lure him to new ventures again, even after the unkindly critical reception for Ken Russell's "Valentino," in which he starred (most reviewers exempted Nureyev from the pan—"Vital Nureyev Upstages 'Valentino,'" the New York Times headline ran, for example).

"I don't regret having done 'Valentino,'" he said. "On the contrary, I would have regretted not having taken the opportunity. But I do find that one has an extraordinary sense of void after doing a film. It is as if this great machine has rolled over you and left you behind, or under the wheels. It's very different from ballet; the theater, with a live audience, is always somehow a source of regeneration, no matter how the performance went."

Yes, he'd like to do another movie, but he's not sure American entrepreneurs consider him "that marketable a commodity." He'd still be interested in playing Nijinsky on screen—"now that we've revived him and there are all these projects, Baryshnikov with his own production company, Herbert Ross talking about a Nijinsky film. After all, we're getting three 'Dracula' pictures aren't we? Why not Nijinsky too? But just to do a film to do a film, that would be no fun; it would have to be of some artistic merit."

The mention of Baryshnikov made one wonder about his reaction to the latter's rejoining the New York City Ballet under George Balanchine. The reply was terse, but not altogether unrevealing: "It doesn't affect me one way or the other."

The notorious pace of Nureyev's career, the ceaseless round of performances, productions and tours is entirely a matter of conscious choice.

"That's what I enjoy," he said. "I'm here on earth to do things. I don't want to waste my life. If I'm a dancer, I must dance to the maximum. If I'm a choreographer, I must choreograph until I'm totally empty."

He once said that he dances best when he's tired. "It's true, that's when the anxiety goes, and when one is accustomed to the stage, the lighting, the steps. With a certain amount of fatigue, peace comes, and sort of evens everything out. Sure, I still have fears when I go out on stage. I am nervous, but it is a productive kind of fear. If you go on stage with no tension, no contradiction, it doesn't happen, the performance doesn't communicate, it loses excitement and freshness."

At present, Nureyev has no plans to change his migratory existence, performing with a large number of companies across the globe.

"Sure," he said, "sometimes I think it would be nice to settle down in one spot. But if I were to stay with one company, I couldn't perform as often as I would like, you see. I've also thought it would be good someday to have a company of my own at my disposal. On the other hand, if I had to run a company, it would take so much energy, and right now I would rather concentrate on dancing."

One subject outside dancing that has strongly engaged Nureyev's attention has been his efforts to arrange for Western visits from close family members in Russia. His face takes on a pitifully melancholic look when asked about the success of his attempts, which have been strenuously supported by people in the artistic community, as well as notables of government. "The KGB tells my mother and my sister they'll never let them out, and apparently it is because of who I am and what I have done," he said. Is he still trying, despite the discouragement? "Yes," he said, very quietly.

If, at an age when most male dancers might be thinking of retiring from the stage, Nureyev has any deep concerns about the waning of his physical powers, he surely gives no sign of it. "Naturally, like anyone else, I have fears and fantasies about what will happen when my technique goes, when I can't dance anymore, about which way in life I'll go, this way or that. To fight those fears, I've mounted classical ballet productions, those which would keep me in shape, and it's proven a very good remedy—'Don Quixote,' 'Swan Lake,' 'Sleeping Beauty,' and so on, these have kept me in very good shape.

"It's true I'm reluctant to do too much choreography, wasting hours with something I might be able to do later when I've stopped dancing. And if I had another life I might explore some other art for a change, stick to music, become a pianist, perhaps. But right now all I know is that I have to do what must be done to fulfill myself—as a dancer."

Nureyev Is 'Romeo'

Theatrical Voltage in a Striking Ballet

By Alan M. Kriegsman

The fascination of the new ballet version of "Romeo and Juliet" which the London Festival Ballet presented at the opening of its two-week Kennedy Center season last night is the way it reflects its author—Rudolf Nureyev, who's not only the architect of the production, but its chief dancing protagonist as well.

Every work of art mirrors its creator, of course. But this ballet seems almost a personal projection of Nureyev, an emanation of his every aspect—his tempestuous, Byronic spirit, his restless, probing mind, the breadth of his dance culture, his exploratory urge, his independence, his superb understanding of theater.

It also puts him in a role with which he's been closely identified for a major portion of his career. Nureyev first danced as Romeo opposite Margot Fonteyn in 1965, in the world premiere of Kenneth MacMillan's version for the Royal Ballet.

The production was filmed with the same pair, and shown on TV too; it was a key factor in spreading his fame in the West and in forging his public image as an artist.

Nureyev has tried his hand at many things in the interim, but it can be no accident that for the subject of his first full-length original choreographic essay, he turned once more to this Shakespearean text and the great Prokofiev score it inspired.

Nureyev's production, created for the London Festival Ballet and premiered by that troupe in England last year, also exhibits one further trait of his not yet mentioned—his still incredible force as a stage presence. At 40, he's no longer quite the hair-raising virtuoso he was 13 years ago, but the theatrical voltage he radiates is, if anything, more intense than ever.

The "Romeo and Juliet" he's given us seems more starkly medieval than wantonly Elizabethan, though both attributes make themselves felt. Nureyev also never lets us forget that this is not just a love story, but a tragedy.



Rudolf Nureyev as Romeo.

The ballet is framed at both ends by four macabre hooded figures playing dice—an intimation of the sense of fatefulness that will pervade the whole work, and a hint of its symbolic tone as well. The image of the wheel of fortune is a recurring one, in the ballroom scene of Act I and in the duel scene.

A wagonload of corpses passing across the stage after the curtain rises, suggesting the commonplace carnage of the era, is the first of several underlinings of approaching death: on her wedding night, for example, a grim specter appears to Juliet and envelops her in dark embrace. Visions and premonitions permeate the ballet's texture, giving it an almost hallucinatory quality.

There are any number of striking, intelligent touches in the choreography and staging throughout—a boisterous, amusing trio for Romeo and his sidekicks, Mercutio and Benvolio, for instance; the sense of menace clearly implied by Prokofiev's music and so brilliantly captured in the general dance for the Capulets in the ballroom scene; the ferocity of

the duels and Nureyev's shrewd solution to the protected death music for Mercutio and then Tybalt; the dying beggar who gives Romeo the shudders before his entry into the Capulet's domain.

The choreography is most clearly an extrapolation from Nureyev's own idiosyncratic trends as a dancer—it's stronger for the men than the women, and it favors tricky embellishment and a characteristic playing with closed and open positions—pirouettes opening to arabesque, for example, or ending in a deeply stretched fourth position.

Except for Romeo's searingly despairing solo in Benvolio's arms (when he learns of Juliet's supposed death)—which got a special, deserved hand on its own—there are no specially memorable set pieces. But there is conspicuous evidence, here and there, of Nureyev's contacts with American modern dance, not just in such things as Grahamesque falls and contradictions, but in a quartet involving Juliet, Paris and the senior Capulets that pays direct homage to Jose Limon's "The Moor's Pavane" (on another Shakespearean subject), be it noted—"Othello"). How well all this is integrated stylistically into the whole is difficult to assess after a single viewing.

The company as a whole demonstrated the kind of fine aptitude for theatricalized dance that seems to be an English trademark. Eva Evdokimova's Juliet was beautifully danced but somewhat pallid—this was certainly not the lusty Juliet we'd been led to expect of the Nureyev production, nor was there much visible romantic current between the leads.

In the major supporting roles, Nicholas Johnson, Kenneth McCombie and Frederic Werner were especially impressive in their assertive masculine presences as Mercutio, Benvolio and Tybalt. Ezio Frigerio's grim, massive sets are surely tragic enough, but scarcely suggest the topic of love; there is, besides, some unresolved discord between their abstract and realistic aspects. Conductor Terence Kern held a sure and sensitive hand over the score, which was a very large asset indeed.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
SUBJECT: Meeting with Rudolph Nureyev

You have received a memorandum from Jack Watson on this subject. Let me add the following additional background.

The matter of a visa for Nureyev's mother has been raised on several occasions with Soviet authorities by both the Embassy in Moscow and the Consulate General in Leningrad. As in the vast majority of such cases, there has been no response.

State urges that you make no public commitment to help Nureyev because he is neither a US citizen nor a US resident, and there is a long list of heartbreaking divided-family cases involving US citizens. State asks that if you do decide to make any public statement on this matter, that they be given the opportunity to add the names of the most hardcore US cases. I support State's view and would recommend that you not make any public commitment or promise to take any extraordinary action on Nureyev's mother's behalf.

CONFIDENTIAL/GDS


July 10/17/90

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 9, 1978

Hugh Carter

The attached was returned in
the President's outbox today
and is forwarded to you for
appropriate handling.

Rick Hutcheson



	FOR STAFFING
	FOR INFORMATION
	FROM PRESIDENT'S OUTBOX
	LOG IN/TO PRESIDENT TODAY
	IMMEDIATE TURNAROUND
	NO DEADLINE
	LAST DAY FOR ACTION -

ACTION
FYI

	ADMIN CONFID
	CONFIDENTIAL
	SECRET
	EYES ONLY

	VICE PRESIDENT
	EIZENSTAT
	JORDAN
	KRAFT
	LIPSHUTZ
	MOORE
	POWELL
	WATSON
	WEXLER
	BRZEZINSKI
	MCINTYRE
	SCHULTZE

	ARAGON
	BOURNE
	BUTLER
X	H. CARTER
	CLOUGH
	COSTANZA
	CRUIKSHANK
	FALLOWS
	FIRST LADY
	GAMMILL
	HARDEN
	HUTCHESON
	JAGODA
	LINDER
	MITCHELL
	MOE
	PETERSON
	PETTIGREW
	PRESS
	RAFSHOON
	SCHNEIDERS
	VOORDE
	WARREN
	WISE

	ADAMS
	ANDRUS
	BELL
	BERGLAND
	BLUMENTHAL
	BROWN
	CALIFANO
	HARRIS
	KREPS
	MARSHALL
	SCHLESINGER
	STRAUSS
	VANCE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

*Hugh -
Let me know what
Ambassador uses for -
J*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

HUGH CARTER *HC*

SUBJECT:

Armored Limo for Use by the First Lady in Rome

The Secret Service has requested that we send one aircraft with one armored limo and one station wagon to Rome for use by the First Lady (memo attached). This request, of course, is based on the critical security situation in Italy. A few months ago, the Secret Service convinced Mrs. Lyndon Johnson not to spend a planned month's vacation at a villa in Italy because of security reasons.

Earlier this year you gave me the authority to make the armored limo decisions on your trips, and you declined them being flown internationally for the Vice President. Because of your interest in this subject, I felt that I should ask you about the First Lady in this special situation.

I recommend that you approve the cars being flown to Rome for the following reasons:

- (1) Foremost, the need for the extra security is obvious.
- (2) The First Lady is on an official mission representing you.
- (3) Approximately ten agents who will otherwise have to fly commercially can also be transported on the limo plane thus saving the air fares.

_____ Approve one aircraft with one armored limo and one station wagon.

V _____ Disapprove

Also, in the future do you want me to make these decisions regarding the First Lady and save you the time?

_____ I will decide each trip

V _____ You handle each trip for me

But minimize

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE



FILE 116-620.12

August 8, 1978

Re Request for Military Support
Aircraft

Presidential Protective Division
Washington, D. C.

Military Assistant to the President
Room 210, East Wing,
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Pursuant to the provisions of PL 9-331, and Interdepartmental Agreement between the Department of Defense and Department of Treasury dated July 15, 1968, Department of Defense support is required by the Secret Service. Failure to obtain the requested support will jeopardize the successful accomplishment of the Secret Service protective mission. Commercial resources or services of the type requested are not available, readily obtainable, or satisfactorily capable of meeting the requirement.

Support required is as follows:

In connection with the visit of Mrs. Carter to Rome, Italy, August 11 - 13, 1978, it is requested that one (1) USAF C-141 be provided for transporting two (2) U.S. Secret Service vehicles (one armored limousine and one station wagon) and approximately ten (10) Secret Service personnel from AAFB, Maryland to Rome, Italy, and return. Following is the itinerary:

August 9, 1978

9:00 p.m. Depart AAFB, Maryland

August 10, 1978

Arrive Rome, Italy.

August 13, 1978

Depart Rome following First Lady's visit and return to AAFB.

This request to transport an armored vehicle to be used by the U.S. Secret Service for the First Lady in Rome, Italy, is predicated on the intelligence gathering by our Agency. That intelligence is still at the same critical

BUY U. S. SAVINGS BONDS AND SAVE



level as was previously reported relative to the proposed trip of the President during July 1978. The Red Brigade activities have still continued and are of serious concern to the U.S. Secret Service.

Our Intelligence Division has been advised that as a result of the activities that are taking place concerning the funeral of Pope Paul VI, almost all available police/security will be summoned to Rome in order to secure that city. Due to this demand on the Italian Security Forces, it is anticipated that the Red Brigade will take advantage of the opportunities of committing possibly several attacks throughout Italy and the immediate area of Rome.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

8/9/78

Mr. President:

Bob feels that a meeting early
this afternoon with Andrus is
necessary before Andrus leaves
town today. When pressed he
said a phone call would do.

☒ schedule meeting
☐ place phone call
☐ other

Phil



P

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT LIPSHUTZ *RL*

RE: Maine Indian Land Dispute

Background

As you will recall, Indian tribes in Maine have asserted a claim to more than five million acres of land in the state. Early in this administration the Justice Department, acting as counsel for Interior, informed the court in Maine that the tribes' claim was sufficiently meritorious to warrant prosecution by the Department. In short, Justice announced its intention to sue the landowners if no negotiated settlement could be reached. Justice strongly urged, however, that the court grant time for negotiations before actually requiring suit to be commenced. The court agreed.

Shortly thereafter, in accordance with the wishes of the Maine delegation--and particularly Senator Muskie--you designated Bill Gunter to study the situation and advise you on it. Gunter made his recommendations in July 1977. Unfortunately, both the tribes and the landowners rejected his proposal. (In theory, Congress needs no agreement from the tribes to pass legislation wiping out their claims. In fact, only tribal consent can end the threat of continued, prolonged litigation. It is the mere pendency of such litigation which is already clouding titles in Maine.)

Last fall a three member task force--comprised of Eliot Cutler from OMB, Leo Krulitz from Interior and Steve Clay, Judge Gunter's law partner--began further negotiations with the tribes. The result was an agreement with the Indians, approved by you in January of this year, with three key elements:

- ° Administration support for legislation which would eliminate all claims against private landowners, with a maximum per landowner of 50,000 acres, in return for which the tribes would be paid \$25 million by the Federal government;

- ° preservation of the tribes' claim against the 14 large landowners (note: even these landowners would each benefit from elimination of claims against 50,000 acres of their land);
- ° preservation of the claim against the State, which held about 350,000 acres.

The agreement was aimed at the key problem in Maine: protecting individual homeowners who are already having difficulty in transferring title. At the same time the agreement provided certain incentives for both the State and the large landowners to settle, but it avoided a Federal financial bailout for these larger parties. You defended this approach in the town hall meeting in Bangor on February 17 (see Attachment 1).

Since February we have been addressing the twin problems of preparing legislation to implement the first part of the agreement, while also attempting to induce the State and large landowners to settle. An important element in the inducement process has been the threat of Justice Department litigation against recalcitrant parties.

Justice did not participate in the negotiations leading up to the agreement with the Indians because the Attorney General had earlier indicated that he feared a possible conflict given his role of counsel for Interior and the tribes. Before we asked that you approve the agreement, however, we requested an opinion from Justice's Office of Legal Counsel as to the constitutionality of drawing a distinction between large and small landowners. OLC responded that legislation embodying such a distinction would be constitutional.

Recent Developments

In May of this year, the Attorney General privately advised that he questioned the fairness of the policy determination to draw a distinction between large and small landowners in Maine. On June 30 he notified the Secretary of Interior that Justice would not sue the 14 large landowners in Maine, although suit would be brought against the State. Since that time Secretary Andrus and I have attempted to persuade the Attorney General to change this position, pointing to its inconsistency with the agreement which you approved and publicly defended.

This dispute became public on Monday of this week, when a Justice Department attorney read a statement in court in Maine unequivocally saying that suit would not be brought against the large landowners. (As of late Friday, we thought we had an understanding that a more ambiguous statement would be made; see Attachment 2.) The result has been a page one story in the Bangor Daily News, opening in a damaging fashion:

U.S. Attorney General Griffin B. Bell said Monday part of Jimmy Carter's blueprint for settling Maine Indian land claims is unfair and therefore he will break one of the president's promises to the tribes. (See Attachment 3.)

Comments

If Justice's statement is permitted to stand, any prospect of a relatively low cost settlement with the large landowners is substantially reduced. Equally important--because it directly challenges the distinction between large and small landowners, which is a key aspect of the legislation which would implement our agreement with the tribes--the statement diminishes the chances for passage of that legislation. (Following extensive consultation, we had been prepared to introduce a bill this week.)

It appears that, if the Administration is to speak with one voice on the Maine issue, your involvement is required.

Secretary Andrus is leaving Washington today for an extended trip, and therefore I have requested we meet with you early this afternoon.

QUESTION: Mr. President, my fifth grade class would be upset if I didn't say hello for the fifth grade class in Fitzborne Middle School in Hamden, Maine.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

QUESTION: My question is since the ice hasn't been broken yet, since our land claims case will set a precedent across the country, I would like to know will other States have to be as lucrative in the giving of land and money as we are in the State of Maine? (Applause)

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, the Indians claims case in the State of Maine was initiated, I think, about 1971 when copies of old treaties were discovered and the Indians felt that they had a legitimate claim in court. Under the laws of our Nation, the Interior Department is responsible for native Americans and is obligated to defend and to protect and even to intercede in court on behalf of the Indians and the Attorney General is required to represent the Secretary of Interior in that relationship.

When I came into office a year ago, this case had been continuing for a long time. And if you think back a year, you can remember that almost every property owner in Maine was in danger of not being able to transfer their own property or to buy additional property because no one could get a clear title even to their own land because of the threat of the Indian lawsuits.

Obviously, I have got as much as I can handle as President. I could recognize very clearly that there are more non-Indians than there are Indians in Maine. So politically, there is no advantage in trying to resolve a question of this kind.

I could have washed my hands of it and said let the people of Maine sweat it out. But I felt then that there was a need for us to resolve it fairly quickly. We have been working on it for a year.

I sent the best lawyer I know up here to work with it, Judge William Gunter. He worked out an agreement that he thought was fair that the Indians rejected. Later, I got Eliot Cutler from Bangor, Maine, knowing your people, to come in and take over as the head of a negotiating committee.

What we have worked out, I think, is a very good resolution. The Indians have accepted it. What it says is that anybody in Maine that owns less than 50,000 acres of land will no longer have to worry about lawsuit attacks on their rights or deeds to their own property.

MORE

ATTACHMENT 1

their own property. That is an agreement that I reached on behalf of the American people and the Congress will have to ratify.

The only ones left still not resolved are 14 landowners in Maine who have more than \$50,000 (acres) and the State of Maine itself. What we have negotiated doesn't put any obligation on those large landowners, nor the Government of Maine.

The Indians have said, if you want to accept it, fine. We are ready to accept it on those terms. But if the Governor of Maine or the 14 landowners don't want to accept it, they have three choices. They can either continue to negotiate, they can accept the agreement that we worked out and have an end to it, or they can stay in court and litigate. I have no preference about it.

I don't have any personal interest in it, as you well know, but I thought it was good to get this question out of the way as quickly as possible to let the people of Maine in two-thirds of the area of your State stop worrying about possible future lawsuits about which they know very little and over which they have had very little control.

So I have done my job as well as I could. We have not imposed the will of the Executive Branch on the State of Maine at all. The Government of Maine is still completely free to do anything it chooses.
(Applause)

One other part of your question, how many other States will be in a similar condition, I don't know. My own preference is that the executives stay out of it and let the Interior Department, representing me, and the Federal Courts settle it. But I felt that in this particular case, so many citizens were adversely affected in Maine, that it was a special case. But I hope that this will be the only instance of this kind in which I, as President, will be involved.

QUESTION: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes?

QUESTION: Mr. President, I am Ed Meadows. I live in Hamden, Maine, just down the river from Bangor. You are certainly correct that we in New England are very much concerned with energy sources and supplies in this region. For that reason, references to wood energy in your opening statement were very heartening.

However, we know that up until this point, that the ERDA Administration has not been particularly concerned or convinced about the potential for great

Maine's largest
daily newspaper

Yesterday's sale \$3,708

VOL. 90—NO. 39

Bangor Daily News

BANGOR, MAINE, TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1978

Chance of rain:
highs 70 to 75

Weather on Page 30

32 PAGES—20 CENTS

U.S. holds up suit against 14 landowners

PORTLAND, Maine (UPI) — U.S. Attorney General Griffin B. Bell said Monday part of Jimmy Carter's blueprint for settling Maine Indian land claims is "unfair" and therefore he will break one of the President's promises to the tribes.

Bell made the comment in a statement delivered in Portland's U.S. District Court, where officials held a pretrial conference on the Indian claims to two-thirds of Maine.

Justice Department officials Monday said Bell has ordered them not to file suit against Maine's 14 largest landowners, mostly paper

Maine's largest landowners negotiating only "fair market sale."
Page 2.

companies. Such a suit was part of the White House agreement with the Indians to settle the case.

But federal representatives said Bell had cleared the way for suit to be filed against the state for \$500 million and 330,000 acres, which was another part of the agreement.

"Bell, believing that it would be unfair to relieve some but not all innocent persons from problems not of their own making, has determined not to bring suit against the remaining

(large) landowners," the Justice Department told the court in a written statement.

The judge in the case ordered all parties to refrain from public comment.

"The United States does not intend to sue only large landowners in Maine. This decision is based on the fact that no meaningful distinction can be made between large and small landowners lying within the claim area," the Justice Department statement said. "All landowners, as we have stated before, are innocent of any wrongdoing, intentional or otherwise."

The Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes claim more than 12.5 million acres, roughly the northern two-thirds of Maine, were taken from them more than 150 years ago in violation of federal law. It is the largest of several such claims pending in the nation.

President Carter had agreed to sponsor a bill giving the Indians \$25 million if they would drop their claims against more than 300,000 Maine residents owning small parcels of land in the contested area.

Carter also promised to have the federal government sue the large lan-

downers, who jointly own more than three million acres, and the state on behalf of the tribes if they did not make separate out-of-court settlements with the Indians.

Response to the latest development in the case was restrained by a standing local gag rule of U.S. District Judge Edward T. Grier's court. The order bars any comment beyond what was said in court because "there's a danger of prejudicing a trial."

Bell's position on the case echoed Gov. James B. Longley's frequent

criticism of the White House for treating the small and large landowners unequally.

Presidential Counsel Robert Lipshutz, a frequent Carter spokesman on the case, could not be reached for comment.

Lawyer Thomas N. Turron, the tribes' chief counsel, said he did not care about Bell's decision because if current out-of-court talks with the large landowners fail "the tribes can and will proceed against them on their own."

ATTACHMENT 3.

Statement of Justice Department
in Court in Maine on August 7, 1978

* It is now the position of the United States that, absent some change in circumstances such as relevant legislation, the United States does not intend to sue only the large landowners in Maine.*

** This decision is based on the fact that no meaningful distinction can be made between large and small landowners lying within the claims area. All landowners, as we have stated before, are innocent of any wrongdoing--intentional or otherwise. The proposed legislation will relieve the small landowners of any responsibility or liability. Attorney General Bell, believing that it would be unfair to relieve some but not all innocent persons of problems not of their own making, has determined not to bring suit against the remaining landowners.**

*Agreed upon language.

**Language added by Justice.

ATTACHMENT 2

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

4755

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 7, 1978

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI 23.

SUBJECT: Arms Sales to Iran

Last month you approved the sale of 31 F-4Es equipped with SHRIKE missiles as part of the package Under Secretary Newsom would present to the Shah during his visit. This combination represents a minimum response to the Shah's request for an anti-radiation capability to counter the highly developed and mobile SAM threat in Iraq and the USSR, and I indicated that we would be reviewing the request more thoroughly.

Although we are unwilling to provide the sophisticated F-4G WILD WEASEL aircraft equipped with the STANDARD ARM anti-radiation missile at this time, as requested by the Shah, we believe Iran's defense would be significantly improved by the addition of an anti-radiation capability and we do not rule out the possibility of providing the F-4G at some point in the future.

At issue now is whether to approve an interim step which conveys our intention of supplying a more advanced anti-radiation capability but allows us to phase Iran's acquisition of such a capability over time depending on how the surface-to-air missile (SAM) threat and other factors develop. Specifically, should the 31 F-4Es be equipped with the necessary wiring to allow the economic conversion to the F-4G configuration in the future?

In the memorandum at Tab A State and ACDA argue that we should not approve the wiring. Cy's arguments include: the violations of PD-13 guidelines involved; the expected sharply negative Congressional reaction; the lack of a military threat to justify this system at this time; and the impression that would be conveyed to the Shah by changing our decision that "we are easily swayed". In the memorandum at Tab B, Defense argues that we should approve this sale on the grounds that: retrofitting the aircraft later should the Iraqi threat develop would be very expensive; and that the wiring itself provides no additional capability.

I agree with Harold on this. We gain nothing by turning down the Shah on such a request. However I must point out that Congress is likely to see approval of the wiring as tantamount to approval

~~SECRET/GDS~~

Jury 10/17/90

~~SECRET~~

of the F-4G technology, and may therefore oppose it -- perhaps quite strongly. We would probably win the eventual vote, but the debate could detract from other urgent priorities during the closing days of this session.

One way of reducing the anticipated Congressional displeasure with the proposed sale of the F-4s with Group A wiring would be to accompany the request with a Presidential commitment along the following lines:

I have notified the Government of Iran that the inclusion of Group A wiring in these aircraft does not constitute a commitment to provide in the future any specific radiation suppression equipment or weapons associated with such equipment. The decision to make available the Group A wiring at this time was taken only on the grounds that Iran wished to retain the option of acquiring an enhanced radiation suppression capability at some point in the future, recognizing that retrofit would be far more expensive than production line installation. Any future equipment will be made as a separate decision on its own merits, including full consultation from Congress.

I believe that such a statement would help defuse the opposition in Congress by making it clear that the decision was taken primarily on economic grounds and that the Congress would have an opportunity to express its views on any additional decisions.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve sale of the wiring necessary for converting the F-4Es to F-4Gs including the STANDARD ARM anti-radiation missile. (I come out this way with many reservations, but largely because I am concerned about Iran's sense of confidence -- about U.S. and its own future -- given the developments in Afghanistan and in the region generally.)

APPRO E _____

DISAPPROVE _____

That you approve the above statement which would accompany the Congressional notification.

APPRO E _____

DISAPPRO E _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 9, 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR RICK HUTCHESON

FROM: RICK INDERFURTH

Attached is a memorandum for the President on arms sales to Iran. We have revised page 2 to add a recommendation on how to deal with the anticipated Congressional displeasure with the proposed sale.

If this memo has already been reviewed by Frank Moore's office, please run this revision past them (similarly with Hamilton Jordan's office). This memo does not need OMB clearance. There are no budgetary issues involved.

re-staff
to FM + HS
cc VP

~~SECRET~~

ID 784111

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*Withdrew by
Indefinite 5/9*

DATE: 07 AUG 78

FOR ACTION: HAMILTON JORDAN

FRANK MOORE (LES FRANCIS)

attached

~~LEM MCINTYRE~~

*restated to HQ + FM
8-9-78*

INFO ONLY: THE VICE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SECRET BRZEZINSKI MEMO RE ARMS SALE TO IRAN

+++++
+ RESPONSE DUE TO RICK HUTCHESON STAFF SECRETARY (456-7052) +
+ BY: 1200 PM WEDNESDAY 09 AUG 78 +
+++++

ACTION REQUESTED:

STAFF RESPONSE: () I CONCUR. () NO COMMENT. () HOLD.

PLEASE NOTE OTHER COMMENTS BELOW:

~~SECRET~~